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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to provide a survey of the complex
and often confusing field of water law in California. Water law in
this state is dynamic and growing. It will continue to change as new
legislation is forged and judicial decisions are rendered.
For ease of understanding, we have broken down the subject of
water law into two parts. The first part of this article will survey the
development of water rights law. The second part of the article
focuses primarily on the current state of water quality law including

the growing area of the water quality-toxics interface.'
PART ONE-WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA

I.

INTRODUCTION

California's system of water rights is often referred to as a "dual
system." This is a reference to the two leading doctrinal bases of
rights to the use of surface waters: riparian water rights and appro-

1. Persons reading this article should be warned that there is no text (excluding case
books) on water rights law that reflects the current state of the law.
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priative water rights.2 In reality a number of other doctrinal bases
support rights to water use, including use of ground water. These
other doctrines are of great importance to the use of water by millions
of Californians. Thus, a more accurate descriptive term for California's system of water rights is that it is a "plural system." The story
of California water fights law is the story of the development of these
doctrines, the tensions among them, and the emergence of the concept
of a public interest in how water is used.
As in all areas of law, the California law of water rights has been
in a state of continuous development since its beginnings. During
about the past two decades, however, the rate of development of
water rights law in California 3 has been especially noteworthy. This
is likely the result of the increasing demand placed upon a finite
resource by California's sustained growth in population and agricultural production, 4 coupled with an enduring, spirited concern over
instream beneficial uses of water.: Developments in the California
law of water rights during these recent decades will receive emphasis
6
in this paper.
A.

Beginnings

It is customary to commence an account of California's water rights
law with a reference to the contribution made by the miners. These
were the thousands who flocked to the western slope of the Sierra
Nevada when word spread of James Marshall's discovery of gold on
January 24, 1848, in the millrace of John Sutter's sawmill on the
South Fork of the American River.
Even before the goldrush, California had been influenced by European cultures. Persons of European ancestry had established religious

2. See generally, 1 W. HUTcmNs, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NITEEN WEsTERN STATES
157 (1971).
3. This paper will treat the meaning of the term "water rights law" to include laws and

policies which control allocation of water supplies, whether expressed by legislatures, courts, or
administrative agencies. It will include federal laws and policies which impact on water supply

allocation in California.
4. See California Department of Water Resources, California Water: Looking to the
Future (Bulletin 160-87), Nov., 1987.

5.

"Water flowing unregulated down a stream is doing work. We should not think of it

as being wasted or unused. Engineers have traditionally considered only man-regulated or
managed water as water being put to use. The question becomes: 'What are the wisest uses in
the best interest of mankind?.' H. HANsEN, Design of Reservoirs, HANDBOOK OF DAU. ENONEERING 658 (A. Golze ed. 1977).
6. Several of these developments receive detailed treatment in other articles in this
Symposium issue. They will nevertheless be mentioned herein so that they may be seen in
context.

960
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missions along the Pacific shore as far north as Sonoma, while
California was ruled by Spain and later by Mexico. Other Europeans
received grants of land from the ruling government, both along the
coast and in the interior. In addition, nearly 3,000 overland emigrants
arrived in California between 1841 and 1848. "Frontiersmen, farmers,
they were the kind of people who had moved America westward from
Virginia to the Missouri River." ' 7 Finally, during the decade of the
1840s the religious missions became secularized and much of their
holdings passed into private ownership. Two-Los Angeles and San
Diego-were viewed as having been founded as "pueblos," political
subdivisions of the civil government." The pre-goldrush settlers, both
of farms and ranches and of missions and pueblos, dealt with the
problem of seasonal aridity by locating near streams and springs. 9
On February 2, 1848, the United States and Mexico signed a treaty
ending a war between the two countries whose major battlefields did
not include what is now California. By the Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo, Mexico ceded California to the United States. 10 The Treaty
confirmed titles to property granted by the former Spanish and
Mexican ruling governments whether the grantee was Californio or
Yankee." California's pre-Gold Rush era contained the seeds of two
water right legal doctrines under which a great deal of water use is
enjoyed today: the riparian and pueblo rights.
B.

The World Rushes In

The attempt by Sutter and Marshall to suppress news of Marshall's
discovery failed. Even in this pre-telegraph era, the word spread
rapidly eastward. The ensuing massive migration is well known.
Within a year of the discovery, the New York Herald characterized
the result as "this general and overwhelming spirit of emigration"
and wondered whether it would lead to "a depopulation of the old
' 12
States for the new republic on the shores of the Pacific.'
7.

J.S.

HoLUDAY,

THE

WoRLD RusHno IN (1981).

8. See, e.g., Feliz v. Los Angeles, 58 Cal. 73 (1881); San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co.,
209 Cal. 105, 287 P. 475 (1930).
9. D.R. LmirLEm, Water Rights during the CaliforniaGoldrush, in XIV W. HisToRicI
Q., No. 4, (Western Historical Association, Logan, Utah, 1983).
10. Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1948, United States-Mexico, art. v. Coincidentally, the Treaty was signed within 10 days of Marshall's discovery of gold at Sutter's mill.
There is no evidence that either Marshall or Sutter knew of the signing of the Treaty, nor is
there any evidence that the signatories in Mexico City knew of the discovery in remote Northern
California.
11. Id.
12. J.S. HoLUmAY, supra note 7.
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Unlike their predecessor rancheros and farmers, the new wave of
3
emigrants began to settle away from naturally existing water supplies.
Nevertheless, water was necessary to support their mining operations
and domestic needs even though the places of use were not on lands
contiguous to a watercourse. It therefore followed that water had to
be diverted and moved from the streams and conveyed to the place
of need. This practice found acceptance in the mining community
even when the place of need was not upon land contiguous to the
source stream. Although the miners were not concerned about the
niceties of riparian water rights doctrine, they were not lawless. When
the supply of water in the source stream was insufficient to satisfy
all demands upon it, these settlers observed the same custom that
they applied to rights of possession of the mining claims themselves:
first in time, first in right. That meant that an earlier diverter
(appropriator) could continue to take water for beneficial use while
a later diverter had to discontinue some or all of his diversion because
of insufficient supply in a common source stream. When this custom
was recognized and enforced by the law courts, the legal doctrine of
water rights by priority of appropriation (or simply "appropriative

rights") was born.
II.
A.

THE PROPRIETARY ERA

Appropriative Rights

For many decades following statehood in 1850, California's water
rights law was almost exclusively decisional law. The chief contribution
of early legislative activity was doctrinal ambiguity. Shortly before
California's entry into the Union, the legislature adopted the common
law of England as the rule of decision in the state courts.' 4 The
common law was thought to include the doctrine of riparian water
rights. A year later, the legislature accepted "customs, usages or
regulations established and in force at the bar, or diggings" as the
formal basis for dispute-resolution in mining areas. 5 As we have
seen, the custom in the diggings was that rights to the use of water
depended upon priority of appropriation. Although neither of these
legislative enactments addressed water rights per se, both were to play

13.

D.R. LnrnsFin,

14.

1850 Cal. Stat. ch. 95, at 219.

15.

1851 Cal. Stat. ch. 5, sec. 621, at 51,149.

supra note 9.
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a role in the development of the law of water rights through judicial
decision.
Not surprisingly, the early decisions arose from water conflicts in
16
the mining regions. The two earliest decisions-Eddy v. Simpson
and Irwin v. Shaw 7-arose in Nevada County, then California's most
8
populous county.1
Eddy considered water right issues which remain important today.
The court held that a water right is a right of use rather than a right
in the corpus of water.1 9 Reasoning from that principle, the court
held that the defendant could not reclaim water brought by him from
a different watershed after it had left his possession-the modern
doctrine of abandonment. However, the greatest significance of Eddy
in terms of basic California water rights doctrine lies in a disposition
of the case that the court did not make. Neither of the parties in
Eddy was a riparian proprietor. Both were companies engaged in the
business of purveying water to miners. In a pure riparian system, the
court might have dismissed the action on the basis that both parties
were without right as mere trespassers. Instead, the court recognized
and protected plaintiff's right to use the foreign water abandoned by
defendant. Nowhere in the decision does the term "prior appropriation" or any variant thereof appear. Nevertheless, the court protected
plaintiffs' right, recognizing that "the foundation of the plaintiffs'
right was their first possession."' 2
Two years later, the California Supreme Court in Irwin affixed a
label to this doctrine and articulated its fundamental priority characteristic. Unlike either of the parties in Eddy, the defendant in Irwin
made some claim to riparian status, since, for mining purposes, his

lands were situated along the bank of the stream. Plaintiffs claimed
their interest as owners of a canal constructed for the purpose of
conveying water to miners without regard to the riparian status of
their claims. The court held that defendant's claim of riparian status
was fatally defective. The defect lay in the fact that the riparian water
right doctrine protected the individual rights of landed proprietors
upon the stream. Defendant had no title to his streamside lands; title

16. 3 Cal. 249 (1853).
17. 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
18. D.R. LrrraEaw, supra note 9.
19. Eddy, 3 Cal. at 252. The court stated: "It is laid down by our law writers, that the
right of property in water is usufructuary, and consists not so much of the fluid itself as the
advantage if its use." Id. (emphasis in the original).
20. Id.
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lay either in the State or in the United States. Therefore, defendant
was not a landed proprietor within riparian doctrine. Both parties
were thus on equal footing insofar as proprietary claims to land were
concerned. Plaintiff had one advantage over defendant. Plaintiff had
commenced his diversion from the stream before defendant took up
the streamside land and began to divert. It was upon this fact of
priority that the case turned. The court noted that the political and
social conditions in the mining regions were unsettled, but that,
nevertheless, some principles had become so firmly fixed as to be
looked upon as having the force and effect of res judicata:
Among these the most important are the rights of miners to be
protected in the possession of their selected localities, and the rights
of those who, by prior appropriation,have taken the waters from
their natural beds, and by costly artificial works have conducted

them for miles over mountains and ravines, to supply the necessities
of gold diggers, and without which the most important interests of

2
the mineral region would remain without development. '
Priority of appropriation, the court added, was to be decided by the
maxim "first in time, first in right.'"2

1. A Period of Development
During the last half of the nineteenth century and into the first
decade of this century, following the Eddy and Irwin decisions, the
doctrine of prior appropriation was developed as the courts worked
out the characteristics of the appropriative right. Although the administration of these characteristics has changed since the last century,
the principles and doctrines themselves remain in effect. In addition,
both the state legislature and the Congress enacted statutes which
affected initiation and exercise of water rights.
2. Doctrine of Relation
In a water rights system where temporal priority is the key to the
right, it is obviously important to establish the point in time at which
priority of the right to use water vests. From among several possibilities, the court chose the date upon which the appropriator took
the first substantial act to effect the appropriation.23

21.

Irwin, 5 Cal. at 146 (emphasis added).

22.

In Irwin, the court used the law Latin expression: qui prior est in tempore potior est

in jure. Id. at 147.
23. Kelly v. Natoma Water Co., 6 Cal. 105, 108 (1856).
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The closely related question of the quantity of the right also arose.
Typically, an appropriator does not immediately upon completion of
diversion and distribution works put to beneficial use the full amount
of water he ultimately intended to use. Instead, there is usually a
period during which the enterprise is developed and the amount of
water use increases. The courts held that the quantity of the right
extended to the amount actually placed to beneficial use, but was
limited by the amount initially contemplated for use.24 The priority
of the diversion would be fixed by the appropriator's first substantial
act to effect the appropriation. A major condition was placed upon
the power of an appropriator to develop use over time while retaining,
as to the full quantity of water ultimately used, the early priority
represented by the date of initiating the appropriation. This condidition was that the appropriator's enterprise be pursued with due
diligence commensurate with the magnitude of the project. 2 What
constitutes due diligence is a question of fact. Taken together, these
principles are called the "doctrine of relation."
3.

Changes in Exericse of Appropriative Rights

Holders of appropriative rights may wish to make changes in the
manner in which they exercise their rights. For example, an appropriator may decide that diversion from the source can be made more
efficient by moving the diversion works, or that domestic use would
make more economic sense than an existing irrigation use. The courts
held that change in point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of
use was permissible in connection with exercise of an existing right,
so long as others are not injured by the change. 26
The importance of this principle is that the priority and quantity
of an existing appropriative right may be preserved notwithstanding
a change in the manner of its exercise-so long as the no injury
condition is met. The alternative would have been to regard such a
change as an attempt to initiate a new right. At best, such a result
would have meant loss of priority and reimposition of the requirement
that the new right be diligently proved up.

24. See, e.g., Senior v. Anderson, 115 Cal. 496, 503-04, 47 P. 454, 456 (1896).
25. Id. See also CAL. WATER CODE § 1396 (Deerings 1977). The due diligence condition
undoubtedly reflected the prevalent populist, anti-speculation views of westerners. The natural
resources of the west were available for the use of the people, but not for acquisition of rights
for speculation.
26. See, e.g., Rameli v. Irish, 96 Cal. 214, 217 (1892). See also CAL. WvATM CODE § 1706
(Deerings 1977).
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4.

Use of Natural Channels for Conveyance
Early appropriators often found it convenient and efficient to divert
water from a bounteous source stream, convey the water across the
watershed boundary, and discharge it into another-perhaps intermittent-drainage system. At some point below the discharge, the
appropriator would redivert the water to the place of use. In such a
case the approriator was in effect using the second stream channel as
part of a conveyance system.
The courts found this to be an acceptable practice. Most importantly, the appropritor was protected in his right to redivert his
"foreign" water as against those having claims to use of the naturally
occurring waters of the second stream. 27 An important extension of
this principle protects the rights of appropriators by seasonal storage,
i.e., those who collect water in a reservoir during a season of surplus
for later release and use during the season of need. In such cases the
channel of the source stream is itself used, in whole or in part, as a
conveyance system to the place of use. Water thus released from
storage for rediversion below is water that is "foreign in time."
"Foreign in time" water is not available for use by others who may
have claims to divert naturally occurring waters of the source stream. 21
5. 1872 Civil Code Provisions
Throughout this period the law of water rights continued to be for
the most part the product of judicial decisions. In 1872, however,
the legislature entered the field. In that year provisions were added
to the California Civil Code creating a statutory method for initiating
and perfecting an appropriative water right. 29 These statutes provided

for the posting of notice of intent to appropriate water and filing the
notice with the county recorder. The notice contained quantification
of the amount of water which was intended to be appropriated. A
diversion project under the California Civil Code would invoke a
statutory variation of the doctrine of relation. The priority of right
subsequently acquired through beneficial use of water would be the
date of posting of the notice. The amount of water to which the

27.

1977).
28.

Hoffman v. Stone, 7 Cal. 46, 49 (1857). See also CAL.
CAL. WATER CODE

WATER CODE

§ 7075 (Deerings

§ 7075 (Deerings 1977). This principle follows as a corollary to the

right of appropriators to use natural channels to convey appropriated water.
29. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1410-1422 (Deerings 1977).
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right of use was acquired could not, however, exceed the quantity
specified in the notice. The Civil Code provisions did not require
governmental permission to initiate an appropriation; their fundamental purpose was to supply a more precise means of fixing the
date of priority of an appropriative right.
Many important appropriative water rights were initiated pursuant
to the Civil Code procedure. However, the courts held that the Civil
Code procedure was not exclusive.30 This meant that appropriative
rights could continue to be initiated by simply taking the water from
31
the source and applying it to beneficial use.

6. Statutory Forfeiture of Appropriative Rights
In addition to providing an alternative, statutory system for initiating and perfecting appropriative rights, the 1872 Civil Code enactment also contained a provision for forfeiture of appropriative rights
by reason of nonuse.32 This section provided that when an appropriator or his successor in interest ceased to use the appropriation for
some beneficial purpose, the right ceased. This principle may be
viewed as a corollary to the requirement for due diligence in applying
water to beneficial use in order to initially perfect the right. Often
referred to as "use it or lose it," the forfeiture principle rests on the
same natural resource allocation policy on which the due diligence
33
requirement was based.
The Civil Code statute contained no specific period of time after
which nonuse would result in forfeiture. Would a farmer's decision
to fallow land for one year cause his water right to be lost? Again
the omission was filled by the court. Reasoning by analogy to the
statute of limitations governing acquisition of prescriptive title by
adverse possession, the court held that five years of continuous nonuse
was the proper measure of time for forfeiture of an appropriative
34
right for nonuse.

30. Lower Tule River Ditch Co. v. Angiola Water Co., 149 Cal. 496, 499, 86 P. 1081
(1906).
31. Although many of these Civil Code provisions have not been repealed, the tendency is
to describe their effect in the past tense. This is so because they are without force insofar as
initiating an appropriation subsequent to December 19, 1914, the effective date of the Water
Commission Act. See infra notes 51-64 and accompanying text (discussion of the Water
Commission Act and the successor California Water Code provisions).
32. Former CAL. Cv. CoDE 1411; see CAL. WATER CODE § 1240.
33. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
34. Smith v. Hawkins, 110 Cal. 122, 127, 42 P. 453, 454 (1895). The five-year period has
subsequently been codified. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1241 (Deerings Supp. 1988).
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7. Reasonableness of Use and Diversion of Water
During this proprietary period the courts began to be called on to
consider allegations of waste, unreasonable methods of use, and
unreasonable methods of diversion of water. As emigration to California continued, competition for use of a limited resource increased.
It is therefore not surprising that later ("junior") appropriators, or
would-be appropriators, might take a hard look at their senior neighbors' methods of use and of diversion of water. Since the prior
appropriation system is characterized by the hierarchy of priorities,
waste or unreasonable use or diversion by a senior appropriator may
mean less water, or no water, for the use of a junior appropriator.
Judicial decisions held that a duty of reasonableness existed between
appropriators. That duty was to avoid "unreasonable waste." Diverters were not, however, required to use the most advanced scientific
methods in exercising their appropiative rights. Rather, the custom
of the locality was the guiding standard against which to judge
35
reasonableness of use and diversion.
8. FederalLand Laws
The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo and California's subsequent entry
into the Union resulted in the existence of vast acreages of federallyowned land within California's borders. 36 In the post-Civil War years,
Congress enacted a series of statutes providing for management and
disposition of these lands.37 While water rights were not the primary
thrust of these enactments, Congress nevertheless recognized that
many water appropriations were made upon the federal lands, and
that considerable water was being beneficially used in reliance upon
these appropriations. Congress additionally recognized that a body of
custom or law was being developed in the western states to resolve
conflicting water claims among the appropriators. The congressional
solution was to ratify these rights to use based on prior appropriation

35. See, e.g., Joerger v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 207 Cal. 8, 23, 276 P. 1017, 1024 (1929).
But see CAL. WATm CODE § 100.5 (Deering Supp. 1988) (local custom is not determinative of
reasonableness, but is one factor to be considered).
36. Today the United States is estimated to own about 48% of the land within California.
BuREAu oF LAND MANAGEmENT, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, Pua ic LAND STATISTIcs: 1986, at 5
(vol. 171, 1987).
37. See, e.g., Desert Land Act of 1877, 19 Stat. 377, 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-339; Mining Act
of 1866, 14 Stat. 253, amended by 16 Stat. 218 (1870), 43 U.S.C. § 661.
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on the federal lands in accordance with the laws of the states.38
B.

Prescriptive Rights

As we have seen, the earliest judidical decisions on water rights
characterized them as real property rights. The doctrine that an owner
of real property can lose title by reason of another's hostile possession
of the property is a fundamental doctrine of the common law-the
doctrine of adverse possession. This doctrine is also applied to incorporeal interests in lands, such as easements, where it is called the
doctrine of prescription. As a water right is an interest in real property,
albeit incorporeal ("usufructary"), the California courts applied the
doctrine of prescription to resolve conflicts among water rights claimants. As applied in water right cases, this meant that a junior water

user could immunize himself against suit by a senior (or paramount)
user by open and notorious use adverse to the 39rights of the senior
claimant for the period of limitation of actions.
C. Pueblo Rights
As noted earlier, communities associated with some of the early
missions took on the legal status of municipalities-pueblos-under
Spanish and Mexican law. The law governing pueblos included a right
to utilize adjacent water sources to meet the needs of the inhabitants.
The California courts in the nineteenth century recognized and protected these rights. These rights encompassed the right to use the
waters of sources that ran through the pueblo, both surface and
underground, from their source to the sea. Pueblo rights are paramount to all other claims. 40
D. Riparianism Vindicated
During the nearly four decades that elapsed between discovery of
gold on the American River and the year 1886, the judicial decisions
and legislation in California treated water rights exclusively in terms
of the prior appropriation doctrine. It is likely that most persons
interested in the law of water rights assumed that California had

38. 43 U.S.C. §§ 321, 661 (1980). The full legal effect of these laws continues to be the
subject of litigation, particularly as to the question of the existence of riparian rights accruing
to federal lands. See infra text accompanying note 107.
39. Alhambra Addition Water Co. v. Richardson, 72 Cal. 598, 607-08, 14 P. 379, 384

(1887).
40.

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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arrived at a "pure" prior appropriation system. Note that there is
no physical or logical impediment to the use of water by exericse of
an appropriative right on riparian lands. Contiguity of place of use
to the water source merely simplifies physical problems associated
with diversion and conveyance of water to its place of use.
However, in 1886 a sharply divided California Supreme Court
decided Lux v. Haggin,41 a conflict between two landowners in the
San Joaquin Valley. One of the parties claimed under the doctrine
of prior appropriation and the other claimed under the riparian
doctrine. The Lux court clearly applied the doctrine of riparian rights
for the first time in California. From this and subsequent cases, many
limitations and attributes of the riparian right have been identified.
The following represents doctrinal limitations on the riparian right:
(a) The parcel of land enjoying a riparian right must at some point
be contiguous to the source stream in which the right is claimed;
(b) water may be used only upon that portion of the riparian parcel
which is within the watershed of the source stream;
(c) unless the right is reserved, a parcel severed from contiguity by
conveyance loses the riparian right and it cannot thereafter be
42
reestablished;
(d) the right does not extend to seasonal storage of water, that is,
the collecting of water in a reservoir during times of surplus for use
43
during times of deficiency;
(e) the right is part and parcel of riparian land and cannot be
transferred for use on other lands. 44
Next is a list of attributes of the riparian right:
(a) Riparian rights are "paramount." This means that riparian rights
as a class must be satisfied before appropriators take water;
(b) the right does not depend upon beneficial use of water for its
existence, and it is not lost by nonuse of water;
(c) unless adjudicated, the right is not quantified. Instead, it extends
to that amount of water which can be reasonably and beneficially
used on the riparian parcel;
41.
42.

Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886).
The courts have, however, implemented a doctrine of "implied reservation" in circum-

stances where an intent to reserve the riparian right to severed parcels can be established outside
the language of the instrument of conveyance. See Hudson v. Dailey, 156 Cal. 617, 624, 105
P. 748, 757 (1909).

43. Lodi v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 7 Cal. 2d 316, 335, 60 P.2d 439, 447 (1936).
"Regulation" of streamflow is permissible under riparian right. See CAL. ADiMN. CODE tit. 23,
§ 657 (1987) (definition of regulation).
44.

This principle may operate to benefit the other riparian lands. A purported transfer of

a riparian right apart from the land is not without legal consequences: the transferor cannot
thereafter assert the right against the transferee. See Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light
Co., 158 Cal. 206, 216-17, 110 P. 927, 932 (1910).
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(d) riparian rights are correlative. This means that at times when
the supply in the source is insufficient to satisfy all reasonable and

beneficial uses on riparian lands, the riparian proprietors share the
shortage.
Despite, or perhaps because of, the length of the court's analysis
in Lux, 45 Californians did not universally applaud this judicial embrasure of the riparian doctrine for this state. The right was perceived
by many as a "dog-in-the-manger" doctrine which could wreak havoc
with uses under appropriative rights and result in great economic
dislocation. This perception was based on the fact that the right was
unquantified, did not depend on use and was not lost by nonuse. An
anti-riparian political movement began, but produced no significant
results. 46 Another four decades passed before popular reaction to
another California Supreme Court riparian rights decision resulted in
a reigning-in of the more pernicious potential of the doctrine. 47
III.

TIE ERA oF TRANSITION

With the dawn of this century, populist sentiments had a firm grip
on Californians and these sentiments found expression in Sacramento.
The populist movement perceived water and other natural resources
as belonging to "the people," instead of to "special interests" or
"monopolies." In 1911 the legislature created a "Conservation Commission of the State of California" to survey the use of natural
resources in California and to report thereon. These reports included
making recommendations for legislation to improve the allocation of
these resources. 4 Water was a key subject. The narrative of the
Commission's report on water makes interesting historical reading.
Populist sentiment is readily apparent.
The Commission perceived two principal evils, or potential for
evils, in the water rights system. First, the Commission was dead set
against what it called the "cold-storaging" of water rights. 4 By this

45. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886). It has been said that the majority
opinion in this case is the longest in the history of the court. STATE OF CALIFORIA, THE
CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAS (W.L. Kahrl 1978).
46. See Address of the State Irrigation Committee to the Fresno and Riverside Irrigation
Convention and to the Anti-Riparian Voters of California (1886) (collection of contemporary
anti-riparian rhetoric). This volume has no attribution as to publisher. It is an accession of the
California State Library in Sacramento.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 85-92.
48. 1911 Cal. Stat. ch. 408, sec. 1, at 822.
49. See STATE OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT OF T E CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF
CALIORNIA at 20 passim (1912) [hereinafter REPORT].
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was meant acquisition and maintenance, usually by "monopolies,"
of legally protected water rights without ongoing beneficial use. Tying
up rights to water use provided opportunity for speculative enrichment
at the expense of persons having plans for timely beneficial use. This
could most likely occur under a system which did not adequately
provide for due diligence to perfect a water right, provide for forfeiture upon nonuse, or where such provisions were not adequately
enforced, Obviously, it could also occur in a riparian water rights
system which does not require beneficial use either to acquire or to
maintain the right.
The Commission's second, but not necessarily lesser, perceived evil
was the manner in which the system administered water rights. At
that time recognition and enforcement of water rights were entirely
the province of the courts. It is clear from the Commission's narrative
report that it did not perceive that the judiciary was the best institution
for water rights administration, at least as the forum of first instance. -0
Implicit in the Commission's criticism is the understanding that decisions affecting the allocation of a limited natural resource among
competing demands involves application of public policy, not merely
interpretation and application of settled property law.
The Commission recommended legislation that reflected the views
contained in its narrative report. As enacted by a receptive legislature,
this legislation was called the Water Commission Act." In broad
outline, that Act contained the basic water rights provisions found in
today's California Water Code, although there have been many
52
statutory accretions in the intervening seventy-five years.
A.

The Permit System

The Water Commission Act declared that all water within the state
is the property of the people of the state, but that the right to use
water could be acquired as provided by law. 53 A state administrative

50. Id. at 25-26.

51. 1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 586, at 1012. The Act took its name from the State tribunal which
was created to administer it, the Water Commission. The Water Commission was the first
ancestor of today's State Water Resources Control Board in the water rights administration
function.
52.

The Act, as amended up to that time, was codified as part of the new California

Water Code in 1943. See generally, CAL. WATER CODE §§ 100, 103 (Deerings 1977).
53. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (Deerings 1977). This citation and those that follow in the
discussion of the appropriative right permit system and the statutory adjudication procedure
are to the Water Commission Act's modem counterparts in the California Water Code.
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agency was created to allocate the state's unappropriated waters.5 4
The Act created a permit system which required an application to
appropriate unappropriated water.55 Before a permit would be issued,
6
the Act required an opportunity for interested persons to protest,
investigation by the state water rights administrative agency,5 and a
58
finding by that agency that unappropriated water is available.
The Act required that permittees exercise due diligence in constructing works and in applying the water to beneficial use. A provision

was also made for approving extensions of time to complete use
where the permittee was found to have been acting diligently.5 9 The
Act adopted the 1872 Civil Code provision for forfeiture of rights by
reason of nonuse but was content not to disturb the decisional law's
holding regarding the time period after which nonuse would result in
forfeiture6 ° Pre-approval of the Commission was required before
effecting a change in point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of
61
use specified in the permit.
B.

System- Wide Stream Adjudication

As noted above, the Conservation Commission criticized the judicial
administration of the water rights legal system, criticism which was
based in part on the piecemeal nature of water rights litigation. The
Conservation Commission recommended and the Water Commission
Act created an in rem statutory procedure for adjudicating and
decreeing the relative rights of all claimants to the use of water in a
particular stream system, whether based on riparian or appropriative
claims. This proceeding was triggered by petition from any claimant
within the stream system, or upon the motion of the state water rights
agency. In either case, the decision to undertake the proceeding was
discretionary. 62
If the state agency decided to undertake the adjudication, following
investigation and hearing, it would make findings with respect to the
relative rights of the claimants. The agency would then file its evidence

54.
55.

Id. §§ 174, 175.
Id. §§ 1250-1258.

56. Id. §§ 1330, 1331.
57.
58.
making
59.
60.
61.

Id. § 1051.
Id. § 1375(d). The agency has broad powers to investigate use of water to aid it in
this determination. Id. § 183.
Id. §§ 1395-1398.
Id. § 1240. See also Smith v. Hawkins, 110 Cal. 122, 127, 42 P. 453, 454 (1895).
CAL. VATER CODE §§ 1700-1706 (Deerings 1977).

62. See id. § 2525.
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and findings with the appropriate superior court, which then conducted proceedings leading to a comprehensive decree. 63 To overcome
the vice of piecemeal litigation, the provisions emphasized the final
judicial adjudication of the relative water rights of all claimants. The
Act provided that it was the duty of all claimants to appear and
submit proof of their claims and, further, that any such claimant
who failed to appear in such proceedings and submit proof of his
claim "shall be barred and estopped from subsequently asserting any
rights theretofore acquired upon the stream system embraced in the
proceedings, and shall be held to have forfeited all rights" to said
water or the use of water theretofore claimed by him on such stream 4
This was, and remains, strong medicine.
C. Attempt to Sunset Unexercised Riparian Rights
It is clear that the inherent power of proprietors of riparian lands
to "cold-storage" their riparian water rights was within the ambit of
the Conservation Commission's distaste.6 This power follows from
the characteristic of the riparian right that it is not lost through
nonuse. Accordingly, the Commission's recommendation for legislation contained, and the legislature adopted within section 11 of the
Act, a provision whereby nonuse of water on riparian lands for any
consecutive ten-year period would release such water to the state and
make it available for appropriation. 66
Many of the other western states have similarly dealt with riparian
claims.6 7 However, section 11 of the Act was not favored by the
California courts. The death blow was struck in 1935 by the Supreme
Court in Tulare Irrigation District v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation

District, when the court held section 11 unconstitutional.68 Another

63. See generally id. § 2769. Section 2769 states that:
The decree shall in every case declare as to the water right adjudged to each party,

the priority, amount, season of use, purpose of use, point of diversion, and place of
use of the water; and as to water used for irrigation, the decree shall also declare
the specific tracts of land to which it is appurtenant, together with such other factors
as may be necessary to define the right.
Id.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. § 2774.
See REPORT, supra note 49, at 27.
1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 586, sec. 11, at 1017.
See 2 W.HurrcmNs, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN

VEsTRN

STATEs 13-14

(1974).
68. 3 Cal. 2d 489, 530, 45 P.2d 972, 988-89 (1935). A close reading of this decision suggests
that the language relied upon as striking down section 11 might have been obiter dicta. However,

it was not regarded as such in subsequent decisions.
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fifty years were to pass before a means was found to attenuate the
threat to security of existing water uses posed by unexercised riparian
rights.6 9
D.

The Federal Presence: The Camel's Nose Under the State
Water Rights Law Tent
1.

The 1902 Reclamation Act

During the nineteenth century, the federal government's attention
towards western natural resources was primarily focused on the management and disposition of public lands.7 0 Shortly after the turn of
the century, the federal government formally entered the western
water arena. In 1902 Congress enacted the Reclamation Act, inau71
gurating a program of water project construction and operation.
Previously, construction and operation of works for development and
conveyance of water was the province of private enterprise, 72 municipalities, and in California, public districts formed pursuant to the
Irrigation District Law and other special-purpose local public dis73
tricts .
The 1902 Reclamation Act was not federal water rights legislation.
Instead, it created the Reclamation Service 74 within the Department
of Interior and, together with many subsequent project-specific authorizing acts, provides for development of water through systems of
works by the federal government to reclaim the western desert. Section
8 of the 1902 Act contained the Act's reference to water rights. On
its face, section 8 appeared to disclaim any intent to affect State
water rights law with regard to water development undertaken pursuant to the Act. In fact, it further appeared to mandate the Secretary
of Interior to administer the Act in strict compliance with the water
rights laws of the various western states. 75 As we shall see, a series

69. See infra text accompanying note 103.
70. See supra text accompanying note 37.
71. Reclamation Act, 32 Stat. 388 (1902).
72. The plaintiff in California's seminal prior appropriation decision, Eddy v. Simpson,
was actually a private water purveyor partnership. Eddy v. Simpson, 5 Cal. 140 (1955). See
also D.R. LrrrLEFE-i,
supra note 9 (analysis emphasizing the private enterprise economic
influence on water rights law).
73. See 1887 Cal.'Stat. ch. 34, at 29 (authorizing creation of irrigation districts).
74. The Reclamation Service subsequently became the Bureau of Reclamation. It enjoyed
a brief interlude as the Water and Power Resources Service, or the WAPRS, during the 1970s.
Under the present Administration, the Bureau of Reclamation again became "the Bureau."
75. Section 8 provides in pertinent part that:

[Niothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any
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of United States Supreme Court decisions was perceived (at least by
the federal bureaucracy) as eviscerating the strong states' water rights
policy implicit in section 8 of the Reclamation Act-until the Court
revitalized that policy in 1978.76

2.

The FederalPower Act

At about this same time, the federal government became interested
in hydroelectric power development. This interest took the form not
of government construction and operation of hydroelectric projects
but of government encouragement of non-federal development by
removing obstatcles to utilization of federal lands. Following a veto
by President Theodore Roosevelt of project-specific legislation which
77
would have made certain federal lands available for that purpose,
Congress responded by enacting the Federal Power Act .7 That Act
created a licensing system for hydroelectric projects proposing to
utilize navigable waters or federal lands which was to be administered
79
by the Federal Power Commission.
As was the case with the 1902 Reclamation Act, the Federal Power
Act was not federal water rights legislation. However, use of water
to generate power is a classic instance of exercise of a water right.O
During the course of congressional debate on measures leading to the
enactment of the Power Act, western legislators exhibited concern
over the potential impact of the legislation on the water rights systems
of the states. Again, as was the case with the 1902 Reclamation Act,
Congress chose to disclaim any intent to interefere with the water
rights laws of the states and included a provision in the legislation to
assure this result. This provision is section 27 of the Federal Power
Act. The legislative history materials of the debates clearly show that

way interfere with laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation,

use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder,
and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall
proceed in conformity with such laws ....
32 stat. 390 (1902).
76. See infra text accompanying note 125.

77.

President Roosevelt's veto was not based on distaste for hydroelectric development;

the President wanted a comprehensive rather than an ad hoc stautory treatment of the problem.
78. Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063 codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)-793, 795-818, 820-

825 (1920).
79.

The Federal Power Commission has since been renamed the Federal Energy Resources

Commission, or the FERC, the federal penchant for choosing infelicitous acronyms being
boundless.
80. See Mentone Irrigation. Co. v. Redlands Elec. Light & Power Co., 155 Cal. 323, 328,
100 P. 1082, 1084 (1909).
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this section was deliberately modeled upon section 8 of the 1902
Reclamation Act and that Congress included it for the same reason
it included section 8 in the Reclamation Act.
3.

The FederalReserved Water Right

Our discussion of federal presence thus far has been of federal laws
which do not directly create any type of federal water right. The issue
has been the interface of federal water project construction and
regulation programs and the water rights laws of the states. However,
in 1908 the United States Supreme Court issued a decision regarding
the water right claims of the Ft. Belknap Indians living on a reservation. The reservation lands had been withdrawn from the public
domain. The Indians had acquired no water rights under state law.
The Court held that the withdrawal of public domain lands by the
United States for Indian reservation purposes operates to impliedly
reserve from appropriation under state law that amount of water
needed to accomplish the purpose of the withdrawal. This "reserved"
right, which is decidedly not based on state law doctrine, enjoys a
priority as of the effective date of the reservation."'
Subsequent federal court decisions have extended the doctrine to
withdrawals for purposes other than Indian reservations and have
held that the federal reserved right doctrine encompasses ground
water . 2
The federal reserved water right doctrine has presented greater
conceptual problems for the water managers of the majority of western
states which rely exclusively, or virtually exclusively, on the doctrine
of prior appropriation. In this case, California's plural system of
water rights is a conceptual benefit. The co-existence in California of
several independent water rights doctrines (riparian, appropriative,
pueblo, prescriptive, ground water) makes federal reserved right claims
considerably easier to accommodate. 83 In any event, the scope of the
doctrine has recently been substantially narrowed by the United States
Supreme Court.A4

81.
82.

winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 567-77 (1908).
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142 (1976).

83.

The Board has routinely determined federal reserved rights in statutory adjudications.

See, e.g., In the Matter of Rights to the Waters of Scott River Stream System, S.W.R.C.B.

(1978) (order of determination).
84. See infra text accompanying note 130.

977
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4.

The End of the Era: Herminghaus

As previously noted, the notion that water users owed each other
a duty not to waste water, and to divert and use it reasonably, had
begun to appear in judicial decisions. 85 This principle was established
as between appropriators. However, no case had squarely faced the
question whether riparian water users, whose rights are generally
paramount to appropriators, were under such a duty as against the
appropriators.
In the 1920s, the Southern California Edison Company proposed
to impound water on the San Joaquin River for hydroelectric power
generation. Downstream, the owner of a large riparian ranch was
accustomed to irrigate the ranch's lands from the river's high spring
and summer flows when the winter snows melted in the Sierra Nevada.
These were not extraordinary flood flows, but rather the regular,
recurring seasonal flows from snowmelt. Edison's upstream impoundment would mean that peaks would be taken off these seasonally
high flows and that water would not naturally reach some of the
riparian ranch's lands to provide irrigation. Edison's impoundment
would have left an ample quantity of water in the river for the ranch's
use but would have interfered with customary irrigation by gravity
flow. Herminghaus sought an injunction against this interference,
emphasizing that her use of water was unquestionably beneficial and
asserting her paramount riparian status. Edison, although an appropriator, suggested that under these circumstances riparian Herminghaus's insistence on her accustomed method of use of water was
unreasonable and therefore that she had no right to enjoin Edison's

hydroelectric impoundment. The case reached the California Supreme
Court, which agreed with Herminghaus. The court held that, a
riparian's use of water being beneficial, the riparian was under no
duty to a mere appropriator to use water reasonably and by a
reasonable method of diversion. 86 The Conservation Commission's
view of the consequences of unbridled riparianism which was reflected
87
in its 1912 Report was thus confirmed.

85. See supra text accompanying note 35.
86. Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 106-07, 252 P. 607, 619 (1926).
87. There is in this State a modified doctrine of riparian rights. Under such rights,
proprietors of riparian lands are permitted to require that all the waters of a stream,
on which their riparian lands are situated, shall flow to their riparian lands ....

The result of this is that enormous quantities of water, which might be, and ought
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IV.

THE MODERN ERA: RULE

OF RREASONABLENESS AND PUBLIC

INTEREST

A.

The 1928 ConstitutionalAmendment

In the view of the people, the court's decision in Herminghaus was
riparianism reductio ad absurdum and the popular reaction was swift
and pointed. An amendment to the California Constitution was
proposed, adopted by the legislature, and approved by the people in
1928.88 While taking care to preserve riparian rights, the amendment
prohibits waste of water and enjoins the rule of reasonableness of
use, method of use, and method of diversion on all uses of water.8 9
Further, it has been held that to the extent water use is wasteful or
otherwise unreasonable, it is not part of a water right. 9°
The 1928 Amendment has been called the fundamental expression
of California's water policy. 91 However, the rule of reasonableness is
not exclusively defined either by statute or judicial decision. We may
draw two general principles from the interpretive judicial decisions:
(1) what is reasonable (or unreasonable) depends upon all the facts
and circumstances of a particular case; and (2) concepts of reasonableness may change over time.Y
B. Amendments to the Water Code Requiring Considerationof
the Public Interest
We have noted that a permit system was created in 1914 by the
Water Commission Act to govern acquisition and maintenance of
appropriative water rights. As enacted, the role of the state agency
charged with administration of the permit system (initially the California Water Commission, now the State Water Resources Control
Board) was limited to determining whether unappropriated water was

to be, put to some beneficial use are permitted to run to waste into the ocean without
doing anybody any good, and in districts subject to flood doing great harm.
REPORT,

supra note 49, at 27.

88. CAt. CONST. art. X, § 2 (1928, amended 1976).
89. Peabody v. Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 368, 40 P.2d 486 492 (1935).
90. Joslin v. Matin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 141, 429 P.2d 889, 895, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 377, 383 (1967).
91. Id.
92. See Kramer & Turner, Prevention of Waste or Unreasonable Use of Water: The
California Experience, AGluc. L.J. 519 (1979-80).
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available to supply the permit applicant. 93 The authority of the State
to make that determination was seen by the Conservation Commission
as central to the goal of the permit system. Without question that
authority continues to be of very great importance. 94 However, in
recent decades the scope of the State's authority in acting on appropriative water right applications has been broadened to include factors
generally grouped under the rubric "public interest." 951
Like the rule of reasonableness, the public interest principle is
nowhere exclusively defined. This lack of definition requires the State
Water Resources Control Board to make policy judgments when a
public interest finding is at issue. The courts will not disturb the
Board's public interest findings so long as substantial evidence exists
to support them in the record upon which the findings are based.9
In proceedings on appropriative water right applications, the public
interest typically focuses on public uses of the source stream or other
water body: fishing, sustenance of other wildlife, and recreation. In
the 1950s the legislature specifically identified these uses as beneficial
uses of water and required that the Board, in determining the amount
of water available for appropriation for other beneficial uses, take
into account the amounts of water needed to be left in the source to
sustain and enhance these uses.Y However, insofar as providing for
these beneficial uses in a particular case requires the reservation of
flows instream and does not contemplate a physical act manifesting
possession of some part of the flow-typically, a diversion of waterthey may not be the subject of an application to appropriate water. 9
C. The CaliforniaEnvironmental Quality Act
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)9 9 is applicable
to State Water Board application and petition approval actions. The
93. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1375(d). See also id. § 1202 (definition of "unappropriated
water"); Modesto Properties Co. v. State Water Rights Bd., 179 Cal. App. 2d 856, $60, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 226, 229 (1960).
94. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1205-1207 (Deerings Supp. 1988).
95. See CAL WATER CODE § 1255, Section 1255 states that: "The board shall reject an
application when in its judgment the proposed appropriation would not best conserve the public
interest." Id. See also id. § 1253. Section 1253 states that: "The board shall allow the
appropriation ... under such terms and conditions as in its judgment will best develop,
conserve, and utilize in the public interest the water sought to be appropriated." Id.
96. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 42 Cal. App.
3d 198, 206, 116 Cal. Rptr. 770, 773-74 (1974).
97. CAL. VATER CODE § 1243 (Deerings 1977). See also id. § 1257.5 (Deerings Supp. 1988).

98. Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 590, 598, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 518, 524 (1979); California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal.
App. 3d 816, 819-20, 153 Cal. Rptr. 672, 674-75 (1979).
99. CA. Pu. Ras. CODE §§ 21000-21176 (Deerings 1987).

980
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Board is typically the "responsible agency," and occasionally the
"lead agency."
An unsettled question exists as to the evidentiary status of environmental documents in adjudicatory proceedings before the State Water
Board. Protested applications require a hearing; further, the Board
may not reject an unprotested application without a hearing.'00 These
hearings are adjudicatory in nature, and administrative due process
of law is therefore accorded the parties. One adjudicatory due process
principle is that findings may not be based solely on hearsay evidence. 01 Typically persons who have contributed data contained in
an environmental document, and drawn technical conclusions and
made recommendations therein, do not testify at hearings. On the
other hand, CEQA requires that the agency consider the environmental
document. In the absence of direct testimony by those who prepare
the document, it may fairly be characterized as hearsay evidence.
Thus, a potential conflict exists between CEQA's requirements and
the due process rules governing adjudicatory hearings. This conflict
has not been resolved by the courts.
V.

WHERE WE STAND TODAY; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

California's water rights system remains firmly pluralistic. Riparian
proprietors continue to exercise water rights that are part and parcel
of their lands. The pueblo rights of the cities of Los Angeles and
San Diego are well-recognized. "Old" appropriative rights-those
initiated prior to December 19, 1914, and continuously exercisedare recognized and protected. Appropriative rights initiated pursuant
to the Water Commission Act and the California Water Code have

statutory sanction and the benefit of a title document issued by the
State. The price paid for these many doctrinal mansions within the
system's house is a pervasive lack of security for all water uses. This
is inherent in a system which: (1) sanctions unregulated first-time use
of water (riparian rights) as paramount to other long-established uses
having doctrinal inferiority; (2) does not widely utilize the statutory
means of integrating intra- and inter-doctrinal claims of right within
a stream system; (3) applies the rule of reasonableness on an ad hoc
basis;'02 and (4) has lately had judicially engrafted upon it the public
trust doctrine.

100.

101.
102.

CAL. VATER CODE §§ 1350, 1351 (Deerings 1977).
See CAL. ADum. CODE tit. 23, § 761(c).
The standard of reasonableness applied by the courts depends on all the facts and
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A.

Riparian Rights

Having reached a peak of doctrinal preference in Herminghaus,
riparianism was reigned in during the following half-century, starting
with the 1928 California constitutional amendment and perhaps culminating in 1979 in In Re Waters of Long Valley Creak Stream
System. 10 3 That case arose from review of a superior court decree
based upon a State Water Board order of determination in an in rem
statutory adjudication proceeding. 1° The State Water Board followed
its long-standing practice of determining priority, amount, season of
use, purpose of use, point of diversion and place of use of all water
rights in Long Valley Creek' 05-including the presently exercised riparian rights. However, also in accordance with long-standing practice, the Board's order did not make a provision recognizing unexercised
("dormant") riparian rights. The proprietor of a substantial amount
of riparian land, who was not at the time of the order using water
on most of the land, excepted to the order. The superior court entered
its decree sustaining the Board's order on this point and the riparian
proprietor appealed. The court of appeal reversed, and the supreme
court granted hearing.
The supreme court held that while unexercised riparian rights could
not be extinguished in the statutory adjudication process, in many
cases they could be subordinated to all presently exercised rights
recognized in the decree whether riparian or appropriative. When at
some future date the riparian proprietor wishes to activate such rights,
he is required to apply either to the Board or to the superior court
for permission. A right thus granted will be incorporated into the
decree but it will have a priority as of the date of the riparian
proprietor's application. Thus, the riparian right will be subordinate
to all rights recognized in the original decree and also to rights,
including appropriative, that may have been granted subsequent to
the original decree, up to the date of the riparian's application. 06
The net effect of this holding is to transform stream systems adju-

circumstances of the particular case and may change over time. But see CAL. ADMnV. CODE tit.
23, §§ 697 (examples of amounts considered reasonably necessary); 698 (action upon an

application for an excessive amount).
103.
104.
105.

25 Cal. 3d 339, 599 P.2d 656, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1979).
See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2500-2900 (Deerings 1977 & Supp. 1988).
See id. §§ 2501, 2769.

106. Long Valley Creek, 25 Cal. 3d at 351, 599 P.2d at 668, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 362 (court's
guidance to the courts and to the Board on these points was explicit).
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dicated pursuant to the statutory adjudication procedure into "pure
appropriation" systems.
Despite the reigning-in of the riparian doctrine itself in the years
following the 1928 Amendment, a recent decision of the California
Supreme Court greatly enlarged the total quantity of lands within
California that may lay claim to riparian rights. That decision, In re
Waters of the Hallet Creek Stream System, °7 is discussed separately
in another article in this symposium. 0°

B.

Modern Appropriative Rights

The permit system inaugurated by the enactment of the Water
Commission Act in 1914 continues to be the basic law applicable to
initiation, perfection and administration of appropriative rights.' °9
C. Standard of Judicial Review
In 1974, the court of appeal in Bank of America N. T. & S.A. v.
State Water Resources Control Board 0 confirmed that the standard
of judicial review of State Water Board findings made in connection
with applications for appropriative right permits is the substantial
evidence test."' That decision also reinforces the weight of evidence
presented by the California Department of Fish and Game in water
right proceedings before the Board to establish the public interest
12
needs of fish, wildlife, and recreation.
D.

Water Rights Enforcement

The authority of the State Water Board to enforce water rights has
also been increased during the past decade. The Water Commission
Act stated that the diversion or use of water in violation of the law
constituted a trespass subject to injunction.13 In an injunction action
4
brought by the Board, the supreme court held in People v. Shirokow

107. 44 Cal. 3d 448, 749 P.2d 324, 243 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1988).
108. See Dunn, Cooperative Federalism in the Acquisition of Water Rights: A Federal
Practitioner'sPoint of View, 19 PAc. L.J. 1321 (1988).
109. See generally CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1000-1106; 1200-1801 (Deerings 1977). See also
CAL. ADmN. CODE tit. 23, §§ 16-18 (1988).
110. 42 Cal. App. 3d 198, 116 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1974).
111. Id. at 201, 204-07, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 771, 773-75.
112. Id. at 207-10, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 775-77.
113. CAL. WATER CODE § 1052 (Deerings 1977 & Supp. 1988).

114. 26 Cal. 3d 301, 605 P.2d 859, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1980).
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that a claim of prescriptive right could not prevail against the State's
interest in regulating appropriative rights after the enactment of the
Water Commission Act. The court expressly left undecided the question whether the prescriptive right doctrine had any vitality as among
private parties and, if so, to what extent and effect. The question
remains unsettled.
By legislation effective January 1, 1988, the State Water Board was
given additional authority under California Water Code section 1052.
Specifically, along with its injunctive powers the Board may now
impose civil monetary penalties against unauthorized diverters. Meanwhile, in 1980 legislation was enacted authorizing the Board to issue
cease and desist orders against water right permittees and licensees
who are found to be in violation of permit or license conditions.'"
E.

The Rule of Reasonableness Revisited

The State Water Board and the State Department of Water Resources are commanded by statute to take all appropriate proceedings
or actions before executive, legislative, or judicial agencies to prevent
waste or other misuse of water." 6 The Board's usual implementation
of this responsibility occurs in evaluating and acting upon applications
to appropriate water. The Board does not permit appropriation of
amounts of water that are unreasonable to serve the beneficial uses
proposed. 117 Similarly, the Board does not give weight to a protest
based upon injury to prior rights to the extent evidence shows that
the protestant's use of water is wasteful or otherwise unreasonable." 8
In 1976 the Board's standing to sue to enforce the constitutional
reasonableness mandate was confirmed by the court of appeal. 19
Subsequently, the Board and the Department of Water Resources
adopted joint rules that create a procedure to investigate and act upon
instances of alleged waste or other misuse of water both within, and
independent of, the application/permit process. 20

115. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1831-1836 (Deerings Supp. 1988). This body of legislation also
provides for civil monetary penalties. Id. § 275.
116. Id. § 275.
117. See CAL. ADmN. CODE tit. 23, §§ 697-698 (1987).
118. See, e.g., S.W.R.C.B., Decision 1592, at 6 (June 16, 1983).
119. People v. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 753, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851, 858 (1976). Note that
the final clause of article 10, section 2, of the Constitution provides both that its terms are
self-executing and that the legislature may enact legislation in furtherance of its policy. See
CAL. CONST. art. X, sec. 2.
120. CAL. ADmN. CODE tit. 23, §§ 4000-4007 (1979).
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F.

Imperial Irrigation District Case

In 1986 the court of appeal confirmed the Board's authority to
implement these rules through conduct of an adjudicatory hearing on
reasonableness issues and subsequent issuance of a binding order
designed to terminate misuse of water.1 2' The case also held that
judicial review of such an order is by way of administrative mandamus
pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. The
standard of review of an order produced by such a proceeding is
independent judgment on the Board's adjudicatory hearing record.
G.

Temporary Urgency Permits

Prior to 1973, no provision of law authorized temporary diversion
and use of water under urgent conditions. In that year, legislation
became effective which authorized the State Water Board to grant
permits allowing such temporary and urgent use.' 22 Subsequently,
parallel provisions were enacted authorizing Board approval of tem1
porary urgency changes in existing permitted and licensed rights. 23
These provisions have increased the ability of water rights law to
be flexible and to act timely. They have proven to be especially useful
in water-short years. Pursuant to statutory authorization, the Board
has delegated to each individual Board member the power to order
exparte issuance of temporary urgency permits and change approvals.

However the ex parte orders are contingent upon subsequent notice
to affected parties, opportunity for a hearing, and Board validation
within thirty days of issuance.
VI.

A.

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS

California v. United States

We noted above that the federal government formally entered the
western water arena with enactment of the 1902 Reclamation Act.
Although that Act contained section 8, which seemed clearly to require
the United States to comply with state water rights law, a series of

121. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1160,
231 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1986).
122. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1425-1431 (Deerings Supp. 1988).
123. Id. §§ 1435-1455.
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United States Supreme Court decisions appeared to interpret section
8 as being merely a compensation statute, that is, as only requiring
the United States to pay just compensation for non-federal water
rights taken in connection with construction and operation of its
reclamation projects. 124 In addition, the cases hinted that section 8
might require the United States to file with the state an application
to appropriate water, but only to give the state notice of its intentions.'21 The critical question was whether the states were authorized
under section 8 to place conditions upon appropriations of water
made by the United States in connection with its water projects.
26
Conditional permits lie at the heart of the modern permit system.1
Miraculously, a federal-state confrontation over this issue had been
avoided for a half-century. In practice the United States, through the
Bureau of Reclamation, not only had filed water right applications
with the state, but had also participated fully in the proceedingsafter voicing for the record the usual disclaimers of immunity to state
water rights law jurisdiction. Moreover, the United States had accepted
permit conditions on its applications, including the numerous permits
issued for the various units of the massive federal Central Valley
Project. Generally the federal government had a good record of
observing permit conditions.
However, in 1973 the California State Water Board issued a decision
ordering issuance of conditional permits to the Bureau of Reclamation
on water right applications for its New Melones Project, a dam and
reservoir which is part of the Central Valley Project.Iv The Bureau
found many of the permit conditions unacceptable-above all, those
which restricted storage in the reservoir until such time as the Bureau
could present a firm plan for consumptive use of the water to be
appropriated by storage. The Board's purpose in so conditioning the
permits was to preserve for so long as possible the free-flowing
character of the Stanislaus River above the New Melones Dam. With
unlimited storage, a substantial reach of the River is inundated by
the still waters of the reservoir.
The United States brought suit in the federal district court to nullify
the objectionable conditions and to confirm what appeared to be the

124. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958); City of Fresno v.
California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
125. See United States v. State of California, 558 Fed.2d 1347 (1977), rev'd, California v.
United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
126. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1253 (Deerings 1977).
127. S.W.R.C.B. Decision 1422.
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limited interpretation of section 8 of the Reclamation Act contained
in prior decisions. The case was ultimately decided by the United
States Supreme Court in California v. United States.'28 The Court
observed that the position taken by the United States on its duty to
comply with state water rights law would "trivialize" section 8 of the
Reclamation Act. Instead, the Court held that the United States, in
constructing and operating water projects pursuant to the Reclamation
Act, must comply with conditions of water right permits issued under
state law, excepting only such conditions which are in direct conflict
with "clear Congressional directives" respecting the project. This was
essentially California's position in the litigation. On remand, the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit approved all of the
conditions in the New Melones water right permits, applying the
29
"clear Congressional directives" test.1
B. FederalReserved Rights Limited
We noted above that federal reserved water rights are rights created
by federal law to serve the water needs of lands withdrawn from the
public domain to establish federal reservations. In a decision arising
from a federal-state water conflict in New Mexico, 130 the United States
Supreme Court limited reserved right water uses on federal reservations to those for which the lands were originally withdrawn-the
"primary" purposes of the reservation. Thus, subsequent federal
legislation that has generally enlarged the scope of uses to which the
National Forests may be devoted' does not operate to enlarge the
federal reserved right appurtenant to these lands. The Court held that
water used to serve these "secondary" purposes must be acquired
pursuant to state water fights law. The specific language of the
decision states that the federal land managers are authorized to acquire
water rights pursuant to the laws of the states governing appropriation.
The holding of New Mexico, along with its specific reference to state
laws governing appropriation, will likely be of considerable importance
in a Supreme Court review of the Hallett Creek case, 32 should
certioraribe granted.

128. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
129. United States v. California State Water Resources Control Bd., 694 Fd.2d 1171 (1982)
(Kennedy, J., opinion).
130. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
131. E.g., Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 215, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-530
(1982).

132.

See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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C. The Public Trust Doctrine
The doctrine of a public trust in the state's management of lands
in which it has ownership interests is relatively ancient in California
taw. t- Prior to 1983, however, no judicial decision squarely faced the
question of the applicability, if any, of the public trust doctrine to
another resource in which the state has a vital interest, that is, waterA3
In that year the California Supreme Court decided NationalAudubon
Society v. Superior Court.1 35 For the first time the court related the
public trust doctrine to the appropriative rights doctrine.
From the perspective of the State Water Board, Audubon has
several important teachings directly applicable to the water allocation
work of the Board. These include the following duties: (1) To take
into account the public trust in the state's waters when acting upon
applications to appropriate water; (2) to re-examine past allocation
decisions if changed circustances warrant; (3) to balance public trust
uses against the need to provide for conventional water uses under
the constitutional rule of reasonableness; and (4) to entertain petitions
for statutory adjudications of stream systems from persons claiming
public trust uses and to consider those uses in framing its order of
determination.
D.

The Decision in the Delta Water Cases

In 1978 the California State Water Board took action with respect
to the waters of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta in a proceeding

which combined the Board's water rights and water quality regulatory
authorities_136 This proceeding produced both a water quality control
plan for the Delta and a water right decision.137 The latter amended
appropriation permits held by the United States Bureau of Reclamation for its Central Valley Project, and by the State Department of
Water Resources for its State Water Project, pursuant to the conditions in the permits reserving jurisdiction."" The water rights for both

133. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal- 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189
CaL Rptr. 346 (1983) (discussing the public trust doctrine and its origins).
134. Id.
135. Id. This symposium contains a separate article on the public trust doctrine in water
law- See Littleworth, The Public Trust vs. The Public Interest, 19 PAc. LJ. 1201 (1988).
136. See CAL. WATERt CODE §§ 174, 123g (creation of State Water Board with combined
water rights and water quality function) (Deerings 1977).
137. S.W.R.C.B., Decision 1485.
138. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1394 (Deerings 1977 & Supp. 1938).
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projects allow upstream storage and direct diversion and rediversion
of stored water from diversion points within the Delta. Most of the
water thus diverted would, if unimpeded, flow through the Delta and
San Francisco Bay to the sea.
The Delta is a great pool from which water is diverted for use in
the San Joaquin Valley and Southern California. The Delta is also
part of an estuary adjacent to the waters of the Pacific Ocean from
whence tidal action causes eastward movement of salinity into the
Delta's myriad channels and sloughs. The extent and timing of the
eastward migration of salts depends at critical times upon the discharge
into the estuary of fresh water from its major tributaries, the Sacramento River and the San Joaquin River. In turn, this discharge
depends at critical times upon operation of the state and federal
projects' reservoirs upstream on the major tributaries, as well as direct
diversion and rediversion of water released from storage at the projects' pumps within the Delta. In addition, water in the Delta serves
important internal irrigation, municipal, and industrial beneficial uses.
Finally, together with San Francisco Bay, Delta waters support important public beneficial uses of water: fisheries, other wildlife habitat,
and water-related recreation.
Needless to say, balancing the Delta-dependent water needs of extraestuary areas of the State with the internal fresh water needs of the
Delta and the Bay is a complex and sensitive task. The water rights
decision produced by that proceeding was immediately subjected to
numerous mandate petitions, 39' about evenly divided between the
extra- and intra-Delta interests. This litigation ultimately produced a
thoroughly considered decision by the court of appeal in United States
v. State Water Resources ControlBoard (the "Delta Water Cases").'1
That decision and some of its consequences are the subject of a
separate article in this symposium.14 ' Again, however, it is appropriate
to list here the major legal teachings of the Delta Water Casesdecision
from the perspective of the State Water Board as it undertakes a reexamination of the complex Delta-Bay issues. They are: (I) The
Board's water quality control plan for the estuary should not be
driven by its water rights allocation authority; (2) to the extent that
a part of the solution to the Delta-Bay
regulation of water rights is,

139.
140.

See id. § 136G.
182 CaL App. 3d 82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986).

141. See Robie, The Delta Decisons: The Quiet Revolution in CalforniaWater Rights, 19
PAc.

Li.1111 (19388.
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problem, water rights held by others than the state and federal projects
should be examined; (3) the public trust doctrine, as articulated by
the supreme court in Audubon, 42 must be applied by the Board in
balancing the competing interests in the uses of the waters of the
4
Delta-Bay estuary; and (4) no "clear Congressional directives'1
immunize the United States from compliance with the amended conditions of its water right permits ordered by the State Water Board's
decision. 144
VII.

Sofi PENDING ISSUES

In this discussion we have made reference to several important
issues which remain for future decision. These include the following
questions: (1) Whether prescriptive rights may still be acquired against
private water users; (2) the evidentiary status of environmental documents, produced pursuant to the California Environmental Quality
Act, in adjudicatory water right proceedings before the State Water
Resources Control Board; and (3) the impact of newly-discovered
riparian rights on federal lands withdrawn from the public domain
45
in light of the California Supreme Court's Hallett Creek decision.1
There are some other important issues facing California's water law
system.
A.

Federal Power Act Preemption

We noted above that the Federal Power Act'" created a federal
regulatory licensing system presently administered by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (the "FERC") for hydroelectric projects proposing to utilize navigable waters or federal lands. Contained
in section 27 of the Act is a state's water rights savings clause closely
modeled upon section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act. In 1946 the
United States Supreme Court decided First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FederalPower Commission, 47 which has been perceived
as holding that the licensing of a hydroelectric project by the FERC

142. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
143. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
144. During the course of the Delta Water Cases litigation, the United States-although the
lead petitioner in the state court litigation-mounted a diversionary attack on Decision 1485 in
the federal court system. The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of California did
not respond favorably to this attack. See United States v. California, 529 F. Supp. 303 (1981).
145. See supra notes 101, 107, 114 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
147. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
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operates to preempt state water rights laws, and that a FERC licensee
may divert and use water for hydroelectric purposes without meeting
state requirements.
The energy shortages of the 1970s precipitated federal and state
legislation encouraging, through tax breaks and otherwise, proliferation of small, run-of-the-river hydroelectric generating projects which
had not been previously economically feasible. 14 Though their contribution to the states' and nation's energy needs are exceedingly
minor, they are capable of having a substantial adverse impact on
public uses of the streams, such as fisheries, which they divert for
power generation purposes.
Diversion and use of water to generate power is a classic exercise
of a water right. In most cases, this use requires an appropiative
water right permit from the State Water Board. Perhaps understandably leary of the Board's duty and authority to condition appropriative
permits with public interest conditions, such as specific flow bypass
requirements to sustain a fishery in the stream reach between the
project's intake and the power plant, some hydroelectric developers
have argued that issuance of a FERC license under the Federal Power
Act preempts the need to obtain an appropriative water right permit
from the state. This argument relies on language in the United States
Supreme Court's decision in First Iowa.
In March, 1987, in a license proceeding before the FERC, a
hydroelectric project developer succeeded in obtaining a declaratory
order from the FERC149 that state water rights laws were preempted
by the Federal Power Act. As a result, the FERC declared its licensees
need not obtain an appropriative water right permit under state law,
citing First Iowa. Incredibly, no agency of the State of California
had been notified of the pendency of the developer's request for a
FERC declaratory order on this issue. Following receipt of the FERC

order by the State Water Board in a routine mailing, the California
Attorney General petitioned to intervene in the FERC proceeding and
requested a rehearing on the preemption issue. The petition to intervene was granted and the request for rehearing was denied. The stage
148. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 106.7. Enacted in the 1970s, this statute declares it to
be legislative policy to encourage the development of small hydroelectric projects as a renewable
energy source. As petroleum has become a glut on the world market in succeeding years and
as its cost has dropped precipitously, the number of environmentally protective provisos and
qualifications of the pro-hydro policy contained in section 106.7 have proportionately increased
through amendment.
149. FED. ENmRGYm
REG. CONIM'N, Order in Response to Request for Declaratory Order
(March 11, 1987) (on file at PacificLaw Journal).
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was thus set for California's appeal to the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals, which was promptly taken. At this writing, the issue is
being briefed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit, sub 50
nom State of California v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.'

B. The American River
Our story of the development of the appropriative water rights
doctrine in California began with reference to the discovery, almost
a century-and-a-half ago, of gold in the millrace of a lumber mill on
the American River. It is fitting that our overview of the law of
California water rights end by noting an important pending water
rights matter again centered on that historic watercourse. In a sense
it illustrates a central problem inherent in our water rights legal
51
system.'
Much of course has changed in the basin of the American River
since the coming of the goldseekers. In its lower reach, at its confluence with the Sacramento River, the Sacramento metropolitan area
has become the home of more than a million Californians. Further
downstream from the confluence, on the eastern rim of the Bay in
the hills of the Coast Range facing San Francisco and the Peninsula,
East Bay communities in Alameda and Contra Costa counties have
become home to another million plus Californians. The municipal
and industrial water needs of much of this population are met by the
East Bay Municipal Utility District from its water development facilities on the Mokelumne River.
One obvious physical change is the existence at Folsom, about
twenty-five miles upstream from its confluence, of the Folsom Dam
and Lake. This facility is a unit of the federal Central Valley Project
and is operated by the United States Bureau of Reclamation. The
Bureau and the East Bay District entered into a contract looking to
the Bureau's delivering to the District of up to 150,000 acre-feet of
water per annum from the Folsom unit. This supply would augment
in dry years the water developed by the East Bay District's own
facilities and is also intended to meet the needs of continued growth
in its East Bay service area.

150.
151.

Docket No. 87-7538 (9th Cir. 1988).
See DvIsioN OF WATER RItHTs, STATE

WATER REsoURcES CONTROL BoARD, Dmwr
REPORT OF RFmREE, AMmucAN RrvER CoURT REFEMUcE (description of the American River
litigation).
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The water supply contract between the Bureau and the East Bay
District calls for delivery of the contract water through the Folsom
South Canal, a facility which conveys American River water southward from an afterbay on the American River a short distance below
Folsom Dam. Water thus diverted from the American River at Folsom
South Canal would then be conveyed westward to the District's service
area.
American River water delivered by the Bureau pursuant to this
plan, under its state-issued water rights, would in effect bypass the
reach of the lower American River between the diversion into the
Folsom South Canal and the River's confluence with the Sacramento
River. That reach of the River supports valued instream uses of water.
These include fisheries (Chinook salmon, Steelhead trout, American
shad), recreational boating, and other river-oriented recreation. The
reach is associated with Sacramento County's prized American River
Parkway
In 1974 the environmental organization, Environmental Defense
Fund (EDF), and others, brought suit in the Alameda County Superior
Court against the East Bay District. EDF's theory is that the existing
plan of delivery of the contract water would violate the trle of
reasonableness of article 10, section 2, of the California Constitution.
This position is based on allegations that it would be feasible for the
East Bay District's contract water supply to be diverted at a point in
the system below the American River-Sacramento River confluence.
Such point of diversion would allow the contract water destined for

use in the East Bay to first serve the valuable instream uses associated
with the lower American River.
Following lengthy litigation of a federal preemption issue m which
ultimately reached the United States Supreme Court, the way was
cleared for state law and state court litigation of the ease.Y3 After
remand, the Alameda County Superior Court appointed the State
Water Resources Control Board referee in the case. The Board was
ordered to render a report responding to numerous spedfic questions
posed by the court. These questions highlight the central substantive
issue in the case. That issue is the authority and responsibility of the
East Bay District to obtain the highest possible quality of water for

152. Enviromnental Defense Fund v. East Bay Mun. UfIL Dist., 20 Cal. 3d 327, 572 P.2d
1128, 142 CaL Rptr. 904, (1977) JEDF I].
153. Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Mun. tJtil. Dist. 26 Cal. 3d 183, 605 P-2d
1, 161 Cal. Rptr. 466, (19S0) JEDF II].
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its people, versus the constitutional mandate to maximize beneficial
uses of water, which include the instream uses of the lower American
River.
But the case also illustrates a more fundamental problem of process.
The sole defendant in this in personam litigation is the East Bay
District. Yet the existing and potential use of American River water
by many others-including use by diversion through Folsom South
Canal-has affected and will increasingly affect the instream uses of
the lower American River. The Bureau of Reclamation itself, which
holds the water rights under which the East Bay District would be
served water and which physically regulates the river at Folsom Dam,
is not a party. The County of Sacramento, which has plans for
increased diversion to meet its own population growth needs, has
intervened as plaintiff in the action; but that county's duties, if any,
to the instream uses of the lower American River are not at issue in
the present case.
We noted above the criticism of the then existing system of water
rights administration made by the Conservation Commission in its
1913 Report. Chiefly it included criticism of the system's encouragement of "piecemeal litigation." Despite enactment of that Commission's legislative recommendations and their subsequent codification
in the California Water Code, the system's administrative capability
of dealing efficiently with modern water right conflicts remains questionable. This problem is highlighted by the American River litigation.

PART TwO-DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF WATER QUALITY
CONTROL IN CALIFORNIA

In 1969 the state legislature enacted the Porter-Cologne Water
Quality Control Act. 5 4 This Act contains a complete regulatory
framework for the regulation of waste discharges to both surface and
ground waters of the state. The Act provides for the adoption of
water quality control plans and implementation of these plans by
adoption of waste discharge requirements for each discharger of waste

154. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13000-13999.10 (West 1972). The author will use the terms
Porter-Cologne Act and Division 7 of the California Water Code interchangeably. Technically
the Porter-Cologne Act is the Act as enacted by the legislature in 1969. Such act has been
amended every year since 1969. However, the term Porter-Cologne Act is so widely recognized

as the state's basic water quality law it will continue to be used for the most part instead of
Division 7.
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that could impact the waters of the state. The Act also contains a
wide array of enforcement tools to ensure that the requirements will
be met.
The Porter-Cologne Act was conceived in simpler times when the
main concerns were the treatment of municipal waste prior to discharge to our ground waters, rivers, bays, and the ocean. Hand in
hand with the Porter-Cologne regulatory program was a multi-billion
dollar federal/state clean water grants program which provided funds
to local agencies to build modem sewage treatment facilities. As time
has moved forward we have, for the most part, successfully handled
municipal waste water problems. Still, many serious water quality
problems must be confronted. For example, many water quality
problems have resulted from the improper storage and disposal of
toxic and hazardous waste, massive discharges of waste water from
storm drains, and the impact of nonpoint sources of pollution from
timber operations, street runoff, and runoff of soil from construction
projects. Since the Porter-Cologne Act became effective on January
1, 1970, Congress has enacted and amended several times the federal
Clean Water Act. 55 In addition, each year since 1970 the state
legislature has added to or amended sections of the Porter-Cologne
Act. The legislature also has enacted significant laws that deal with
toxic and hazardous materials and hazardous waste. 56 Therefore, in
an important way, the state's water quality control program is much
different today than it was in 1970.
The purpose of this part of the article is to survey the water quality
control laws in California and explain their implementation. The
history of events leading up to the adoption of the Porter-Cologne
Act has been dealt with in other articles and will not be repeated
here. 57 At the end of this article is a discussion of the growing edge
of water quality law and how the water quality and water rights laws
interface.
155. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511376, (1986)). The latest amendments are contained in Public Law 100-4 (1987) and are codified
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1311 (1986). Initially the act was called the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act and is now commonly referred to as the Federal Clean Water Act.
156. See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25100-25249 (hazardous waste control);
id. §§ 25249.5-25249.13 (Safe Drinking Water Act of 1986 approved by Proposition 65 on
November 4, 1986); id. §§ 25280-25299.6 (underground storage of hazardous subtances); id. §§

25300-25395 (hazardous substance account); id. § 25400 (liability for abatement of hazards); id.
§§ 25500-25541 (hazardous materials release response plans and inventory); and id. §§ 2557025570.4 (environmental quality assessment).
157.

Robie, Water Pollution:An Affirmative Response by the California Legislature 1 Pac.

L.J. 2 (1970) (discusses the history underlying the enactment of the Porter-Cologne Act).
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I.

PORTER-CoLoGNE WATE=

QUAInY CONTROL ACT

The Porter-Cologne Act is the basic water quality control law for

California. It is a broad-based regulatory program designed to protect
water quality and to protect beneficial uses of the state's waters. The
Act is implemented by the State Water Resources Control Board L5

158. CAL. WVATER CODE § 174 (West 1971). The state water board was created by the
legislature in 1967, based on the realization that decisions affecting water quality and water
rights were inseparable. Between 1950-1965, concerns about the impact of water quality on the
lives of California citizens began to develop. For example, when the state water project was
being developed, the Department of Water Resources recognized that water quality was an
important consideration. When the federal Shasta Dam was built, downstream rice production
dropped because the water released from the dam was too cold. This was a water quality
consideration that had to be taken into account in constructing Oroville Dam. Thus, the
Department designed the Oroville Dam with a multi-level outlet structure to draw off water at
the proper temperature to accommodate downstream beneficial uses. The Thermalito afterbay
was also deliberately designed as a large shallow pond for warming the water. The Department
recognized that maintaining water quality in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta (the location
of the Department's export pumps) would be a problem. Water quality needs would have to

be met in the Delta for agricultural and domestic uses. Additionally, the water had to be good
quality for export to the San Joaquin Valley and Southern California.
With groving concern about water quality, several bills were introduced in the legislature in
1963 to strengthen the then existing W-ter Pollution Control Board. Since water quality concerns
were far more than traditional health related pollution problems, the name of the state pollution
board was changed to the State Water Quality Control Board. A prime function of the Board
was to establish water quality control policies. The state departments (including the State
Department of Water Resources) were to recognize this policy in planning and carrying out
their activities. Thus, the legislature in 1963 made a significant change in California mter
policy. A state board was created to take charge of both the broader field of water quality
control and the limited field of sewage and industrial waste control.
In 1965 a report was issued by the Little Hoover Commission. The report recommended that
the water quality program be turned over to the Department of Water Resources. At that time,
the executive officer of the State Water Quality Control Board was Paul Bonderson. Although
Mr. Bonderson died in 1983, his thoughts on the history of the water board are preserved
through a series of interviews which have been compiled in the regional oral history, Bancroft
Library, University of California, Berkeley. With respect to turning over the water quality
functions to the Department of Water Resources, Mr. Bonderson statedIt]he report recommendations that the program in essence be turned over to the
Department of Water Resources and the California Water Commission was totally
inappropriate. The reason being is the Department, which the Commission is involved
with is the biggest purveyor of water in the state of California, with possibly the
exception of the Bureau of Reclamation. So there's a fundamental conflict here. How
can they (Department of Water Resources) regulate people who have an interest or
an activity that conflicts with the basic interest or responsibility of the Department
as a purveyor of water? They are a vested interest. So, just fundamentally it was
wrong.
Instead of combining the regulatory functions with respect to -waterquality in the Department,
Mr. Bonderson saw the need to have a coordinated water regulatory program. Mr. Bonderson
also recommended combining the state water rights board and the water quality board into an
overall water regulatory agency that would handle both quantity and quality considerations.
During the next two years, the Assembly Water Committee held hearings and issued reports
concerning the impact of combining the two boards. The three main reports are as follows:
ASSE Ly INmum Conirimam ON WATER, A Pnoposao WATER REsouRcEs CONTROL BOARD
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(State Board) and the nine regional water quality control boardsY 9
At the outset, it is necessary to understand that the State and
regional boards implement portions of the federal Clean Water Act
as well as the Porter-Cologne Act. The boards also implement the

permit provisions (section 402) as well as certain planning provisions
(sections 205, 208, and 303 of the federal Act). 1' ° This means that

the state issues one discharge permit for purposes of both state law
(Porter-Cologne Act) and federal law (Clean Water Act). Under state

law, the permit is officially called a waste discharge requirement.
Under federal law, the permit is officially called a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permit (NPDES permit). A NPDES

permit is required for all point discharges of pollutants to surface
waters. A point source is a discernible, confined, and discrete con-

veyance, such as a pipe, ditch or channel. Under the federal Clean
Water Act, a point source does not include return flows from irrigated
agriculture.' 6' All other discharges that could impact water quality or
beneficial uses, including return flow from irrigated agriculture, re-

quire waste discharge requirements unless waived by the regional
board.'6 For example, the discharge of treated sewage by the city of

FOR CA~ioRuA (a staff study) (1966), AssEmELY IriNxum Comnrrrn REPORT, NEw HoRIzoNs
N CAtuORNmA WATER D=mropmr, Vol. 26 (Nov. 16, 1966), and FtaN. RPoRr oF THE STAT:E
WATER QuALrim CONTROL BOARD, Usarm. WATERS OF CAUFORNIA, Pub. No. 37 (1967) (page
71 contains a summary of the 1967 legislation creating the State Water Resources Control
Board).

AB 163 was introduced in 1967 to create the State Water Resources Control Board. Mr.
Bonderson recalls the legislative action as follows:
Ji]t passed rather quickly; there was not a great deal of delay or controversy over the
bill. The only controversy I recall with the bill was that the discharge group ... I
use the phrase "discharge group," which included people like the League of California
Cities, the Supervisors Association, the Farm Bureau, whatnot. The only real argument
and debate was over having what was finally put into the bill as a water quality
advisory committee, which was to be made up of essentially the old appointive
members of the state water quality control board.
Subsequent to the passage of the legislation combining the water rights and water quality
boards into the present board, the Assembly Water Committee requested that the Board study
the need to reform the state's water quality control laws. The Board created a study panel
composed of a cross-section of industrial, agricultural, and state and local government persons.
The panel issued a report recommending certain changes in the water quality control laws but
no changes in terms of organization of the state or regional boards. The study panel's
recommendations were enacted into law as the Porter-Cologne Act. This act did not create the
Board. The Board was created by special legislation in 1967. The Porter-Cologne Act was
passed in 1969.
159. CAL. WATER CODE § 13200 (West 1971).
160. See 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1342 (West 1986) (permit provision), 1285 (determination of
amount), 1313 & 1288 (planning provision).
161. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362 (West 1972).
162. CAL. WAT=R CODE §§ 13370-13389 (West 1971) (enables the State Board and the nine
regional water quality control boards to operate the NIPDES permit program in California)
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San Francisco to San Francisco Bay requires a NPDES permit. A
non-point discharge of waste to surface water or any discharge of
waste to ground water requires the issuance of waste discharge requirements unless waived. The latter includes discharges from land
fills, discharges resulting from mining operations, etc. The issuance
of NPDES permits has been integrated with the regular PorterCologne Act process for the adoption of waste discharge requirements.
Also, federal water quality planning requirements are met by the
provisions of the Porter-Cologne Act. 163
For ease of understanding, the remainder of the discussion will be
broken down as follows: planning, waste discharge requirements and
NPDES permits, enforcement, State Board functions and responsibilities, and the "growing edge of the law." The last category includes
recent statutory enactments which impact the regulation of water
quality.
A.

Planning
Under the Porter-Cologne Act, the regional boards have adopted
water quality control plans for most areas within their regions. 164 The
plans are continually reviewed and updated as required by state and
federal law.' 65 The water quality control plans are essentially blueprints
for water quality control, somewhat akin to a general plan for a
county. The plans contain an inventory of beneficial uses of the water
within the region and water quality objectives to ensure the reasonable
protection of beneficial uses and the prevention of nuisance. 16 The
objectives are not merely directory, but are really standards that must
be implemented by the regional boards. The regional boards look at
a wide range of factors in determining appropriate water quality
objectives. The plans also contain an implementation program to
achieve the objectives.' 67 Such a program includes a description of
In enacting these provisions, the legislature found that state assumption of the federal permit

program was in the state's best interest because it would "avoid direct regulation by the state
law." Id. See id. § 13372 (West 1971) ("tlo the extent other provisions of [division 7] are
consistent with the provisions of this chapter, such provisions shall be applicable to actions and
procedures provided for in this chapter"). The legislature stated that any requirement of these

provisions would prevail over other provisions of the Porter-Cologne Act (division 7) to the
extent of any inconsistency. Id.
163. Id. §§ 13160, 13164, 13170, 13240-47 (West 1988) (discusses state compliance with
federal regulations).

164. Id. § 13240 (West 1971).
165.
166.

See 33 U.S.C.A.§ 1313 (1986), CAL. WATER CODE § 13240 (West 1971).
Id. § 13241 (West 1971).

167.

Id. § 13242 (West 1971).
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the actions necessary to achieve the objectives, a time schedule for
these actions, and a description of the surveillance necessary to
determine compliance with the objectives. The plans can also specify

certain conditions or areas where the waste discharge or certain types

of waste will not be permitted. 168 For example, under this authority,
regional boards have adopted discharge prohibitions in certain areas
of the California coastline which are of special biological significance.
Water quality control plans or amendments are not effective unless
approved by the State Board. 69 If the Board does not approve the
plan or amendment, it sends it. back to the regional board with
directions regarding necessary changes. If the regional board does not
make the changes, the State Board has the authority to hold a hearing
in the area covered by the plan and then make the changes itself.
Planning which covers waters regulated under the federal Clean Water
Act requires approval by the federal Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). Such plans, or portions of plans, are submitted to EPA for
review and approval.1 70 When approved by the EPA, the water quality
objectives, beneficial use designations, etc., become water quality
standards under the federal Clean Water Act. The State Board may
also adopt a water quality plan without first having the plan adopted
by a regional board.1 7' However, such a plan can only deal with
surface waters. Pursuant to this authority, the State Board adopted
the water quality control plan for Lake Tahoe because the lake covers
two states. The Board has also adopted water quality control plans
for ocean discharges and a thermal plan covering elevated temperature
wastes in order to ensure statewide consistency in the implementation
of the Porter-Cologne Act.
In addition to approving regional board water quality control plans
in the first instance, the State Board is empowered to adopt state
policies for water quality control. 72 The operative effect of adopting
a policy is several-fold. First, all regional board water quality control
plans must conform to the State Board policies. In practice, the
regional boards specifically incorporate the wording of the policies
into plans or incorporate the policies by reference. Second, in implementing the plans by regulatory actions such as waste discharge
requirements, the regional boards must implement the State Board

168.

Id. § 13243 (West 1971).

169. Id. § 13245 (West 1971).
170. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313 (1986).
171.
172.

CAL. WATER CODE § 13170 (,Vest Supp. 1988).

Id. §§ 13140-13147 (west Supp. 1988) (state policy for water control).
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policies as well as other relevant provisions in the plan. Finally,
adoption of a policy ensures statewide consistency in dealing with
specific issues. The policies contain water quality principles and guidelines for long range resource planning, including ground water and
surface water management programs and control and use of reclaimed
water. 173 The policies also contain water quality objectives at key
locations for planning and operation of water resources development
projects and for water quality control activities as well as any other
principles and guidelines deemed essential by the State Board for
water quality control. Since 1970 the State Board has adopted seven
policies.

-

At times it has been difficult to discern why the State Board decides
to adopt a policy rather than a plan. Both essentially require notice
and a hearing or an opportunity for a hearing, but the effect is
different in each case. When the State Board adopts a water quality
control plan, such plan supersedes any regional plan to the extent of
any inconsistency. Such supersession is automatic. The regional board
need not act to delete the inconsistencies from its plan before the
State Board's plan is effective. Any policy or plan adopted or approved by the State Board is binding on other state agencies unless
specifically authorized to the contrary by statute. Except for prohibitions or specific limitations in plans, plans and policies are not
really self-implementing. That is, either the State Board or a regional
board must take some further action to make the plan or policy come
alive and have a real world impact. Such an action can be the
adoption of waste discharge requirements, NPDES permits, cleanup
and abatement orders, or any of the myriad of other enforcement
orders available to a regional board. In the next section of this article,
we will see how the system of requirements, permits, and enforcement
makes the water quality protection program work.

173. See, e.g., State Water Resources Control Board Resolution 6&-16 (establishes a general
policy of nondegradation for both surface and ground waters). However, this policy does have
some flea'bility to allow changes in water quality where it is in the best interests of the state.
Id.
174. The eight policies are: the water quality control policy for the enclosed bays and
estuaries of California, the water quality control policy on the use and disposal of inland
waters used for powerplant cooling, the state policy for water quality control, the statement of
policy with respect to maintaining high quality of waters in California, the policy and action
plan for water reclamation in California, the policy on the disposal of shredder waste, a policy
regarding the regulation of undergroemd tanks, and a policy defining "sources of drinking

water."
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B.

Waste DischargeRequirements and NPDES Permits

The water quality portion of this article began with a discussion of
the difference between waste discharge requirements and NPDES
permits. It is an important concept and presented early in order to
prepare the reader for the following discussion.
There are in California about 8,500 dischargers of waste to surface
and ground water presently under waste discharge requirements or
NPDES permits. About 1,200 of the 8,500 have NPDES permits. By
volume, most of the waste discharged is to the ocean from the cities
of San Diego and Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sanitation
District, Orange County Sanitation District, the city of San Francisco,
and numerous other cities and special districts along the coast. About
5,600 of the dischargers discharge their waste to non-ocean or other
non-saline waters. This means they either discharge to fresh surface
waters, or to land overlying groundwater or directly to groundwater,
either of which may be used for drinking water or for agricultural
uses. In any event, a massive number of discharges must be regulated
in order to protect fresh water for domestic and other uses.
Because most of the dischargers in the state are regulated via waste
discharge requirements rather than NPDES permits, it will be simpler
to explain the regulatory enforcement process in terms of the stateonly waste discharge requirements. However, it is important to remember that all discharges of waste to surface waters have special
requirements and time lines that are mandated by the Clean Water
Act and implemented by the NPDES permits that are issued by the
state.
The Porter-Cologne Act requires that anyone who is discharging
waste or proposing to discharge waste which could affect the quality
of the state's waters must file a "report of waste discharge" with
that regional water quality control board within whose jurisdiction
the discharge lies. 7 5 Also, a report of waste discharge is required if
there is a material change in the volume, location, or nature of the

discharge. Dischargers who fail to file a report are subject to a wide
variety of enforcement actions by the regional board (including fines)
or a court action by the attorney general or a county district attorney.

175. CAr. WATER

CODE

§ 13620 (West

Supp. 1988).
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In simple terms, all dischargers of waste to the waters of the state
must apply for and receive from a regional board a waste discharge
requirement. This is a document which tells a discharger what it can
and cannot discharge to the waters of the state. Such waters include
the ocean, all bays and estuaries, lakes, rivers, streams, and all ground
water.1 76 Assuming that the report of waste discharge is properly and
completely filed with the regional board (with the necessary filing
fee), then the regional board staff analyzes the discharge and prepares
draft waste discharge requirements. The draft is sent to the discharger
and other interested persons, such as other public agencies which may
use the water, the Department of Fish and Game and others. The
requirements are then placed on the agenda of the regional board
meeting for adoption by the full board. Regional boards may modify
77
the staff recommended requirements.1
Adoption of waste discharge requirements by a regional board is a
quasi-judicial action. Therefore, all parties, including the discharger,
any person opposed to the discharge, and the regional board staff,
can present direct testimony and be subject to cross examination. The
requirements must implement the water quality control plans and
protect the beneficial uses of the receiving waters. 7 If there is no
water quality control plan for a body of water, then the regional
board determines what the beneficial uses are of the receiving water
179
and what the quality of the discharge must be to protect those uses.
The board then sets the limits on the discharge.
At this point, it is important to emphasize two key points of law.
First, the Porter-Cologne Act states without reservation that all discharges of waste to the waters of the state are privilges and not rights,
and even if a discharger has waste discharge requirements, the discharger has no vested right to continue the discharge.'10 That is, the
regional board could order termination or reduction or modification
of the discharge. The second important concept is that the regional
board need not allocate all of the waste assimilative capacity of the
receiving water.' This means that the regional boards should be
conservative in determining how much waste can be discharged in
176. Id. § 13050(e) (defines waters of the state as "any water, surface or underground,
including saline waters, within the boundaries of the state").
177. Id. § 13223(a) (West 1971). The actual adoption of waste discharge requirements is a
board function and cannot be delegated to the board's executive officer or the staff. Id.
178. CAL. WATER CODE § 13263(a) (West 1971).
179. Id.
180.
181.
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Id. § 13263(g) (West 1971).
Id. § 13263(b) (West 1971).
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each instance. The boards must anticipate that some sewage treatment
facilities and industrial treatment facilities will malfunction from time
to time and that there will be accidents and unanticipated spills and
discharges by persons intent upon avoiding the law. The boards must
also anticipate growth and additional discharge. Each waste discharge
requirement contains monitoring requirements. These requirements
must be met by the discharger at his own expense. Major dischargers,
such as cities and large industries, wil generally have employees
prepare the monitoring reports. Smaller dischargers may contract out
the work to private companies. In either event, the discharger is
responsible for the data submitted and either the discharger or his
agent signs under penalty of perjury that the data submitted is
18 2
correct.
The regional boards have a staff of inspectors who spot check the
dischargers. In general, the larger dischargers are inspected more often
than the smaller ones. The Porter-Cologne Act provides that regional
board staff may inspect a discharge with the consent of the owner,
and if the owner does not consent, then the regional board can get
an inspection warrant from the appropriate superior court.8 3 Only
rarely in the last seventeen years has a regional board needed an
inspection warrant.1 4 The regional board is subject to special rules
when regulating individual disposal systems, such as septic tanks, 8 '
and solid waste sites or former solid waste sites. 8 6 Special rules also
87
apply to the regulation of sites that accept hazardous waste.1
C. NPDES Permits

As previously mentioned, the enactment of the Porter-Cologne Act
in 1969 provided for the complete regulation of the discharge of waste
and other actions that could impact the quality of surface and ground
waters. In 1972 Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (Clean Water Act). 88 The Clean Water Act provided for a permit

182. Id. § 13267(b) (West Supp. 1988).
183. Id.
184. See Joseph v. Masonite Corp., 148 Cal. App. 3d 6, 195 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1983) (warrant
held valid).
185. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13280-13283 (West Supp. 1988) (policies and requirements

concerning individual disposal systems).
186. Id. § 13273 (West Supp. 1988).
187. See, e.g., id.§ 13261(c) (Vest Supp. 1988) (criminal penalty for persons who dispose
or discharge hazardous waste and knowingly furnish a false report on the activity).
188. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (1986) (Congress enacted the statute over President Nixon's

veto).
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system to regulate the point discharge of pollutants to the navigable
waters of the United States. After some judicial interpretation, nav-

igable water was defined as any surface body of water. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was charged with its implementation.
The Act also provided that if a state had sufficient authority, it could
implement a permit system in lieu of the system developed by the
EPA. 8 9
In late 1972 the California Legislature enacted a law amending the
Porter-Cologne Act to provide the necessary authority for the state
to operate a NPDES permit program in lieu of the federal system.
This law is codified in Chapter 5.5, Division 7 of the California
Water Code. Chapter 5.5 contains selected provisions of the federal
act which are necessary for California to substitute its program for
the federal system. As a result, the issuance of the California permit
satisfies both state and federal law. The provisions amending the
Porter-Cologne Act include: the authority to issue permits for a fixed
term not exceeding five years, inspection and monitoring, notice to
the public, notice to the EPA, notice to any other affected state,
protection of navigation, enforcement, a pretreatment program, and
the necessary enforcement authorities. By the terms of Chapter 5.5,
the state also incorporates by reference existing and future changes
in the federal Clean Water Act and the implementing regulations.1 90
To incorporate the previous regulations under the Porter-Cologne
Act, Chapter 5.5 states that the permits for the point source discharges
of pollutants to surface waters are subject to the other provisions of
the Porter-Cologne Act that are consistent with Chapter 5.5.191 This

means that the other provisions of the Porter-Cologne Act supplement
the provisions of Chapter 5.5.
In the discussion above we pointed out the need for a discharger
to file a report of waste discharge. The State Board's regulations
provide that a report of waste discharges is the equivalent of a
NPDES permit application. 19, When the regional boards issue NPDES
permits, they must ensure compliance with all terms and conditions
of the federal Clean Water Act and regulations adopted under it by
the EPA. This means that, to fully understand how the regional

189.

See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(b) (1986) (state permit program requirements).

190. See id. (the statute does provide for incorporation by reference; it was necessary to
substantially amend Chapter 5.5 in 1987 in order to fully comply with the 1987 changes to the

federal Clean Water Act).
191.
192.
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CAL. WvATER CODE § 13372 (West Supp. 1988).
CAL. ADmIN. CODE tit. 23, § 2235(b) (1987) (definition of report of waste discharge).
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boards integrate the NPDES permit system into the Porter-Cologne
Act, the practitioner must be fully knowledgeable not only with state
law and regulations, but with the federal Clean Water Act and
regulations adopted under it. This is important because the EPA
regulations determine not only the procedures and time lines to be
followed in issuing NPDES permits, but some of the water quality
standards and discharge limits. An important part of the NPDES
permit program is the so-called pretreatment program. This program
was not a part of the original Porter-Cologne Act but was inserted
with the adoption of Chapter 5.5. Simply stated, the pretreatment
program gives the state the authority to apply to industrial users of
Publicly Operated Treatment Works pretreatment standards promulgated by the EPA. Such standards are limitations on what can be
discharged to a municipal sewer system. The standards are enforced
to protect the treatment works from damage due to industrial discharges and to protect the receiving waters from substances that could
pass through the treatment works untreated and thus impair the
quality of the receiving waters. The state can enforce the pretreatment
standards directly against the discharger to the municipal treatment
works or may enforce the standards through the permit issued to the
publicly operated treatment works itself. The latter is the preferred
alternative. By virtue of the state and federal law, no state regulation,
permit, or order is required for the State and regional boards to take
an enforcement action against industrial users for violation of pre93
treatment standards.1
D. State Water Resources Control Board
We have discussed the regional water quality control boards and
some functions of the State Board in terms of programs. However,
in order to have a complete picture of water quality control in
California, we must discuss more fully the State Water Resources
Control Board (State Board) as an entity and consider some of its
functions that do not fit neatly under any specific heading.
The State Board has wide ranging authority to hold any hearings
and conduct any investigations in any part of the state necessary to
193.

Water quality enforcement actions can be taken by either a regional board or the State

Water Resources Control Board. During the last seventeen years, however, the State Board has

not taken a single enforcement action against any discharger of waste to the waters of the State
of California. The State Board received and acted upon more than 400 petitions to review
regional board actions during the same time period. In general, any enforcement action required

under the Porter-Cologne Act is taken by a regional board.
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carry out its vested powers. 9 4 The State Board is also the state agency
designated as the state water pollution control agency for purposes
of the federal Clean Water Act. 195 Therefore the State Board (or the
regional board at the direction of the State Board) is the only agency
that directly implements the federal Act. This procedure allows the
EPA to deal with one agency for the implementation of the Clean
Water Act.
The State Board also conducts a wide range of investigations and
research regarding water quality issues. Some of this work is done by
State Board staff, while some is contracted out to other agencies,
196
colleges and universities, or the private sector.
Another important Board function is preparation of the budget.
While the regional boards have a large degree of autonomy, it is the
State Board which is responsible for the preparation of its own budget
and the budget of the regional boards. 97 This authority allows the
State Board to exercise significant policy influence on the regional
boards.
Also, it is the State Board which adopts administrative regulations
for the implementation of the legislative mandates. This is an important function since it ensures statewide uniformity of the water quality
program.
The State Board is also responsible for the operation of a complex
grants and loans program. Through loans and grants the state funnels
federal funds and state bond funds to local agencies for the construction of sewage treatment facilities. 98 In recent times, the grants were
approximately 87.5% of the eligible costs of the treatment facility.
This was, of course, a great incentive for local agencies to build
needed facilities. Use of grant monies has allowed the facilities to
consistently meet their waste discharge requirements. However, the
state-federal assistance program is now phasing into a loan program,
and only time will tell whether the loan program will provide the
same incentive as the grant program.
194. CAL. WATER CODE § 183 (Vest Supp. 1988).
195. Id. § 13160 (West Supp. 1988).
196. Id. §§ 13161-13163, 13165-13166 (vest Supp. 1988).
197. Id. § 13168 (West 1971).
198. See id. §§ 13400-443 (West Supp. 1988) (state financial asistance policies and procedures); 13450-13469 (also known as the Water Conservation & Water Quality Control Board
Law of 1986); 13600-13612 (West Supp. 1988) (federal assistance program); 13955-13969 (also
known as Clean Water and Water Conservation Bond Law of 1978); 13970-13983 (West Supp.
1988) (also known as the Clean Water Bond Law of 1970); 13985-13998 (West Supp. 1988)
(also known as Clean Water Bond Law of 1974) (West Supp. 1988); 13999-13999.16 (West
Supp. 1988) (also known as the Clean Water Bond Act of 1984).
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The State Board also licenses the people who operate sewage
treatment facilities to make sure that competent personnel are employed. Competent personnel are more likely to protect the public's
investment and ensure that waste discharge requirements will be met. 199
Finally, the State Board has the authority to commence an adjudication to protect the quality of ground water. This authority has been
exercised only once during the last eighteen years. 2 w
E.

State Board Review of Regional Board Action

The Porter-Cologne Act provides that any aggrieved person may
petition the State Board to review specified actions or failure to act
by a regional board. 2° 1 The petition must be received by the State
Board within thirty days of the regional board action or within sixty
days after a request has been made by the petitioner to the regional
board to act. 20 2 The State Board can additionally review on its own
motion actions or failure to act by a regional board at any time.
Therefore the State Board is not constrained by the thirty and sixty
20 3
day limits that apply to the petitioner.
There have been over 500 petitions filed with the State Board since
January 1, 1970. Petitioners come in all forms. They can be the
discharger petitioning for review of his waste discharge requirements
alleging that they are too strict. Petitioners can also be a public
interest group or an individual alleging that the requirements are not
strict enough. Petitioners can be other public agencies, such as the
state Department of Fish and Game or a local public agency. The
basic test for petitioners is that they are "aggrieved."
If the petition is filed in a timely manner, the State Board must
decide whether or not to accept it.20 If the State Board does not
accept the petition, the regional board action becomes final and the
petitioner is free to seek a judicial remedy. Experience has been that

199.

Id.

§§

13625-13634 (West Supp. 1988) (waste water treatment plant certification and

operator certification requirements).
200. Id. §§ 2100-2102 (Vest 1971).
201. Id. § 13320 (Vest Supp. 1988). Not all regional board actions are reviewable under
this section. For example, a water quality control plan adopted by a regional board is not
reviewable under this section because the State Board must approve the plans under another
section of the law before the plan can become effective. Most regulatory actions of a regional
board involving adoption of waste discharge requirements, NPDES permits, and any subsequent
enforcement actions are subject to State Board review.

202.

Id. § 13320(a) (vest Supp. 1988).

203.
204.

Id.
CAL. AnmnN.

CODE

tit. 23 §§ 2050-2053 (1981) (petition procedures).
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few judicial actions have been filed based upon State Board refusal
to accept a petition.
If the Board accepts a petition, it has 270 days to deal with the
merits of the issues raised therein.20 5 The evidence before the State
Board is the record before the regional board and any other relevant
evidence which, in the judgment of the State Board, is required. 0 6 In
general, this means that the Board's staff will cull through the regional
board record and make a preliminary decision as to whether or not
the record contains answers to the issues raised in the petition. If the
record is sufficient, then the Board does not hold a hearing but
prepares a draft order in response to the petition based solely upon
the record before the regional board. If the record is insufficient,
then the Board will supplement the record after notice and a hearing
or upon stipulation of the parties. The hearing is a typical quasijudicial hearing, where evidence is taken under oath and crossexamination allowed. The State Board may find the regional board
action or inaction to be appropriate and proper or inappropriate and
improper.2 0 7 In the latter case, the State Board has the options of
directing the regional board to take the appropriate action, taking
the action itself, or referring the matter to another state agency having
jurisdiction . 20 More often than not, the State Board has found
regional board actions to be appropriate and the petition is then
dismissed. When the State Board finds that the regional board action
is inappropriate (or partially inappropriate, as is usually the case) the

State Board will ordinarily direct the regional board to take the
appropriate action.
Seldom is a State Board order in response to a petition appealed
to the courts. If an appeal is taken, it must be filed within thirty
days of the State Board action.209 The evidence before the reviewing
court is the record before the State Board, including the regional
board's record and any other relevant evidence which, in the judgement of the court, should be considered.2 10 In rendering its decision,
the court is directed to apply its independent judgment of the evi21
dence. '

205. Id. § 2052(d) (1981).
206. CAL. VATER CODE § 13320(b) (West Supp. 1988).
207. Id. § 13320(c) (West Supp. 1938).
208.
209.
210.
211.
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Id. § 13330(a) (vest 1971).
Id. § 13330(b) (West 1971).
Id.
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F.

Enforcement

There are a wide variety of enforcement actions which regional
boards can take to ensure that NPDES permits and waste discharge
requirements are met. The enforcement action can be administrative
(taken by the regional board itself) or judicial. If judicial enforcement
is selected the matter is referred to the State Attorney General which
then takes the case to the appropriate state or federal court. Until
recently, the preferred enforcement technique was reference to the
attorney general for both injunctive relief and the imposition of civil
monetary remedies by the courts. Now it appears that the preferred
enforcement process, at least for civil monetary remedies, is an
administrative action. We shall begin our discussion of enforcement
with this administrative process.
Effective January 1, 1985, the regional boards were empowered by
statute to administratively impose civil liability on dischargers for a
variety of violations of the Porter-Cologne Act. 2 2 If administrative
civil liability is imposed for non-NPDES dischargers, the remedy is
in lieu of other Porter-Cologne Act civil liability provisions.2 1 The
process of imposing civil liability begins when the regional board
executive officer issues a complaint to the alleged violator. 214 The
complaint must be served personally or by certified mail. The complaint must state the action or inaction which constitutes the violations
and the citation of authority for imposing the liability. The complaint
also states the amount of the proposed liability. In determining the
amount of liability, the regional board executive officer must take
into account:
the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation or
violations, whether the discharge is susceptible to cleanup or abatement, and with respect to the violator, the ability to pay, the effect

on ability to continue in business, any voluntary cleanup efforts
undertaken, any prior history of violations, the degree of culpability,
economic savings, if any, resulting from the violation, and such

other matters as justice may require. 2"'

212. See, e.g., id. §§ 13261(b)(1), (d)(1) (vest Supp. 1988) (civil liability for filing a false
report or failing to file a report); 13265(b)(1), (d)(1) (West Supp. 1988) (civil liability for
discharging waste); 13268(b)(1), (d)(1) (West Supp. 1988) (civil liability for failure to furnish or
furnishing false technical or monitoring program reports); 13350(d)(1), (f)(1), (e)(1) (West Supp.
1988) (civil liability for various cleanup and abatement violators).
213. Id. § 13326 (West Supp. 1988). But see id. § 13385 (regarding NPDES permits).
214. Id. § 13323 (West Supp. 1988).
215. Id. § 13327 (West Supp. 1988).
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The complaint must also state that a hearing will be conducted by

the regional board or a panel thereof within sixty days after service
unless waived by the alleged violator.
The provisions of the Porter-Cologne Act governing administrative
civil liability state that such orders become final and effective upon

issuance. If no person petitions for review within thirty days the
"order shall not be subject to review by any court or agency." 216
This means that such orders cannot be reopened or reconsidered by

a regional board if no person petitions for State Board review within
thirty days after the regional board issues the order. In addition to

the issuance of orders imposing administrative civil liability, the
regional boards have numerous other enforcement options. First, the
regional board can issue a cease and desist order.2 17 Such an order is
based upon the violation of a waste discharge requirement, a NPDES
permit, or a prohibition in a water quality control plan. The cease
and desist order was especially important in the early days of the
Porter-Cologne regulatory system. The order enabled the regional

boards to prevent new connections to a publicly operated sewage
system if such a system was violating or threatening to violate its
waste discharge requirements.2 18 In the 1970s, there were numerous

limitations placed on new connections to sewer systems by the regional
boards. As the state-federal grants and loans program funded greater

216. Id. §§ 13323(d), 13324(a) (West Supp. 1988).
217. A cease and desist order is based upon a violation of waste discharge requirements,
a NPDES permit or a prohibition in a water quality control plan. The violation can be actual or
threatened (order must be adopted by the regional board itself and cannot be issued ex parte
by the board's executive officer). See id. § 13223 (West 1971).
The cease and desist order can direct compliance forthwith, in accordance with a time schedule
set by the board, or in the event of a threatened violation, direct appropriate remedial or
preventive action. The cease and desist order is widely used by the regional boards as a device
to place dischargers on a strict time schedule. If the order is violated, the boards will generally
refer the violations to the State Attorney General for enforcement action such as injunctive
relief. Id. § 13331 (West 1971).
The Attorney General may also, at the request of the regional board, seek to impose civil
liability on the violator. See id. § 13350 (West 1971) (cease and desist orders based upon
violations of waste discharge requirements and California Water Code section 13385 regarding
cease and desist orders based upon violations of NPDES permits).
218. Id. § 13301 (West Supp. 1988). This section provides in part that the regional boards,
"in the event of an existing or threatened violation of waste discharge requirements in the
operation of a community sewer system, [may issue] cease and desist orders [to] restrict or
prohibit the volume, type or concentration of waste that might be added to such system by
dischargers who did not discharge to the system prior to the issuance of the cease and desist
order." Id. See CAL. ADMN. CODE tit. 23, §§ 2240-2245 (cease and desist orders enforcement

procedure). See also Morshead v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd., 45 Cal. App.
3d 442, 119 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1975); Pacific Water Conditioning Assn'n v. City of Riverside, 73
Cal. App. 3d 546, 140 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1977) (policy and purpose of cease and desist orders).
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numbers of publicly operated treatment works to update their physical
facilities, the need for limitations on new connections grew less and
less. Today, it is not so much a question of sewage treatment plants
being over capacity that causes violations as it is operation and
maintenance problems. While cease and desist orders are still adopted
in appropriate cases, the regional boards are increasing the use of the
administrative civil liability orders 219 and the clean up and abatement
order.220
The use of these two orders is important because they can be issued
on short notice and deal with a violation almost instantly. The PorterCologne Act allows the regional board executive officer to issue the
orders directly, generally without a regional board hearing. If either
order is not complied with, the regional board itself can request
judicial enforcement by the State Attorney General. 221
In emergency situations the regional board has the option of going
directly to court to seek a judicial remedy. An emergency situation
arises where there is a discharge of waste within the board's region
which is taking place or threatening to take place which does or will
cause a pollution or a nuisance.m While this appears to be a potent
weapon to stop pollution, it has rarely, if ever, been used.
If there is a violation of a regional board enforcement order, the
regional board can seek judicial enforcement. The board can seek

injunctive relief or, in some cases, civil monetary remedies. M For

219. See CAL. VATE CODE §§ 13261(b) and (d), 13265(b)(1) and (d)(1), 13268(b)(1) and
(d)(1), 13323-13327, 13350(d)(1), (e)(1), and (f)(1), 13385(c) and (e) (West 1971 & Supp. 1988).
220.

See CAL. WATER CODE § 13304 (West Supp. 1988 (cleanup and abatement order can

and generally is issued by the executive officer of a regional board). The order is issued ex
parte without notice or a hearing and is essentially an administrative injunction directing a
discharger to do something or stop doing something. Id. The cleanup and abatement order can
be based upon a violation of existing regional board orders (e.g., waste discharge requirements)
or where someone has discharged waste or threatens to discharge waste. The effect of the order
is to mandate the discharger to "clean up [the] waste [discharged] or abate the effects thereof
or in the case of threatened pollution or nuisance, to take other remedial action." Id. § 13304(a)
(West Supp. 1988). If the discharger fails to comply with a cleanup and abatement order the
regional board can seek injunctive relief in the courts.
221. CAL. WATER CODE § 13340 (West 1971).
222. Id.
223. See id. §§ 13304, 13331, 13340, 13361, 13386, 13522.7, 13525, 13951 (West 1971). See
also id. §§ 13173(e), 13261(b)(2) and (d)(2), 13265(b)(2) and (d)(2), 13268 (b)(2) and (d)(2),
13350, 13385(b), (c) and (e) (West 1971 & Supp. 1988) (civil monetary remedies). All monies
collected under division 7 of the Water Code are placed in the State Board's clean up and
abatement account. Id. § 13441 (West 1971). Funds in the account can be used for cleanup of
waste by a regional board or other public agency. Id. § 13442 (West 1971). In addition, the
regional boards can use the funds to remedy a significant unforeseen water pollution problem
posing an actual or potential health threat for which the regional board does not have adequate
resources budgeted. Id. § 13443 (West 1971). In practical terms the demand for funds far
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some violations, the regional boards can also seek criminal penalties.1 4
The enforcement actions are at the discretion of each individual
board, and, as a result, there may not be strict uniformity as to
method or level of enforcement from region to region. Also, it should
be noted that levels of civil and criminal liability will vary depending
on whether the discharger is regulated by waste discharge requirements
or a NPDES permit.m
II. THE

GROWING EDGE OF THE LAW-REGULATION OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE

The provisions of the Porter-Cologne Act contain a vast array of
authority to protect water quality. However, certain statutory provisions in the California Health and Safety Code supplement the PorterCologne Act. First, there are the general statutory provisions regarding
the regulation and enforcement of hazardous materials and hazardous
waste.226 Then, beginning in 1983, statutes were enacted to deal with
three specific types of perceived hazardous waste problems-surface
impoundments containing hazardous waste, underground storage of
hazardous substances, and underground injection of toxic substances.
While these three statutes were designed to protect water quality, they
were not codified as part of the Porter-Cologne Act. Instead, they
were codified as a part of general laws relating to hazardous waste
in the Health and Safety Code. In November of 1986 the voters
approved an initiative measure entitled "The Safe Water Drinking
and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986" (commonly known as Proposition 65). This Act attempts to regulate the discharge or release of
cancer causing chemicals and reproductive toxins to drinking water.
This Act also added to or amended existing provisions in the Health
and Safety Code. Neither the three statutory enactments nor Proposition 65 fits neatly into the Porter-Cologne Act process. Instead,
each of the four laws has its own set of definitions or incorporates
by reference existing definitions in the Health and Safety Code. The

exceeds the funds in the cleanup and abatement account and therefore the State Board exercises

its discretion in determining how the funds in the account are dispersed. See id. §§ 13441(c),
13442, 13443 (vest 1971).
224. Id. §§ 13261(c), 13265(a), 13268(a), 13271(c), 13272(c), 13387, 13522.6, 13525.5, 13526,
13754 (west 1971).

225. In general, the civil monetary remedies and criminal penalties associated with NPDES
permits reflect the level of remedies and penalties in the federal Clean water Act.
226. See CAL. HALr H & SArFEY CoDE §§ 25130-25250 (hazardous waste control), 25300-

25395 (hazardous waste substance account, which is commonly called the State Super Fund).
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existence of the Porter-Cologne Act and the Health and Safety Code

statutes does not necessarily mean that they cannot be implemented
in an integrated manner to protect water quality. However, the

multiple statutes do mean that persons dealing with these statutes
need to exercise caution.
A.

Permitting and Enforcement-General Regulation of Hazardous
Waste

Chapter 6.5 of division 20 of the California Health and Safety
Code contains detailed provisions for the regulation of hazardous
waste. Included in Chapter 6.5 is regulation of generators of hazardous
waste, waste haulers, hazardous waste facilities, hazardous waste

disposal, and land use.?27 In general, the hazardous waste laws are a
comprehensive "cradle to grave" program directed toward preventing
the release of hazardous substances into the environment. These laws

will, if properly implemented, greatly reduce the adverse impact of
such waste on water quality. These laws are implemented by the
Department of Health Services.
The Health and Safety Code provisions regarding hazardous waste
and the Porter-Cologne Act water quality control provisions operate

jointly in the issuance of permits for hazardous waste facilities and
in enforcement actions. A hazardous waste facility permit is required
for a storage or treatment facility, waste transfer station, resources
recovery facility, or waste disposal site.? Disposal of hazardous waste
at a facility without a permit is prohibited. 9 The permits are issued
by the Department of Health Services.? 0 Since the Department of

Health Services would be issuing permits which may affect water

227. The state's hazardous waste control law is designed to ensure, in part, that the state
has the minimum requirements to implement the federal Resources Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA).
228. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25201 (West Supp. 1988). Such permitting requirements
are in addition to the State Water Board's regulations. See CAL. ADmaN. CODE tit. 23 §§ 25102601. However it is important to note that the Department of Health Services and State Water
Board use the same definition of hazardous waste as contained in California Health and Safety
Code section 25117. See also id. §§ 2521 (hazardous waste); 66300 (applicability). Hazardous
waste is waste or combinations of wastes, which because of its quality, concentration, or
physical, chemical or infectious characteristics may either: (a) cause, or significantly contribute
to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible,
illness, or (b) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or environment
when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25117 (West 1971).
229. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25189.5 (vest Supp. 1988).
230. Id. at § 25200. See also 22 CAL. ADmN. CODE tit. 23 §§ 67100-67108 (general facility
standards for interim status and permitted facilities).
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quality protective measures, the Department is specifically prohibited
from issuing a permit which is in conflict with any determination by
the State Board or regional board relating to water quality. At a
minimum, the determinations of the State or regional boards would
include: water quality policies; water quality control plans containing
water quality objectives; and decisions, orders and requirements adopted
by the respective board. Also, the permit issued by the Department
of Health Services must include any limit or requirement imposed by
the regional board. These requirements include those contained in
waste discharge permits for the facility.2 l It is important to note that,
with certain minor exceptions not directly related to water quality
control, the state's hazardous waste control laws do not limit or
abridge the administration and implementation of the Porter-Cologne
2
Act by the state and regional boards.21
Enforcement and cleanup authority is available to the Water Board
under the Porter-Cologne Act, even if a hazardous waste is involved.
This authority is also available to the Department of Health Services
and, to a certain extent, the regional boards, under provisions of the
California Health and Safety Code. Cleanup can be carried out by
the Department, a regional board, or a local agency. Most cleanups
in California are carried out by responsible parties pursuant to a
Water Board or Health Services order. Admittedly, there is not always
a bright line delineating when one agency or the other will take an
enforcement action. However, it is clear that, if the state must fund
a cleanup, the persons responsible for the discharge must reimburse
the state for all its costs plus any other penalties assessed. 2 3 Both
the Department and regional boards possess a wide range of administrative enforcement tools to deal with discharges of hazardous waste.
The regional boards' authority has been discussed in a previous
section. The administrative authority of the department includes
suspension or revocation of a permit. 23 One basis for a department
enforcement action includes violation of provisions of the Porter-

231.

CAL. H

232.

State and regional Porter-Cologne authority is specifically reserved in California Health

AT & SAPETY CODE § 25205(b) (WVest Supp. 1988).

and Safety Code section 25159.22 (Toxic Injection Well Control Act), in the California Health
and Safety Code section 25208.11 (Toxic Pits Act) and in the California Health and Safety

Code section 25299.5 (Underground Tank Law). Proposition 65 is silent on the Porter-Cologne
process except to provide that drinking water is defined, in part, as water so designated in
water quality control plans. See id. § 25249.11(d).
233. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25360 (West Supp. 1988); CAL. WATER CODE §
13304 (vest 1971).
234. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25186 (West Supp. 1988).
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Cologne Act.2 5 Judicial actions to enforce administrative orders or
to enforce other provisions of the hazardous waste laws can be brought
by the state attorney general, city attorneys, and county district
236
attorneys.
A release of hazardous substances which is not cleaned up can
result in a listing of the affected site and expenditure of state funds
pursuant to the State Super Fund law.2 7 Remedial actions to clean
up a site can be taken by persons responsible for the release, a city
or county under specified conditions, the department, or if appro-

priate, a regional board.238 Some funds are available to the department
for emergency actions.239 With certain exceptions, the department
cannot expend Super Fund monies unless it issues specified orders or
enters into specified agreements.2 ° The sites are ranked based upon

potential hazards to the public and other criteria.24 Remedial action
plans must be prepared or approved by the department or a regional
board for each of the listed sites. This shared function between the
department and water boards is another example of the integrated
2
health/water quality partnership of the two state agencies .
B.

Underground Tanks

The state's underground tank law, in general, provides for the
licensing, inspection, and monitoring of underground storage tanks

235. Id. §§ 25186(a), 25187 (West Supp. 1988).
236. Id. § 25182 (West Supp. 1988). Civil actions can be instituted to collect fines pursuant
to California Health and Safety Code sections 25187.5, 25187.6, 25188, 25189, 25189.2, 25189.3,
25189.5, 25191, and 25196. See also id. §§ 25190, 25191, 25195 (West Supp. 1988) (criminal
sanctions). Apportionment of civil and criminal fines is made pursuant to the formula contained
in California Health and Safety Code section 25192.
237. See id. § 25320 (West Supp. 1988) (defines release to include any spilling, leaking,
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or
disposing into the environment).
238. Id. § 25351.2 (,Vest Supp. 1988).
239. Id. § 25354 (West Supp. 1988).
240. Id. § 25355.5 (vest Supp. 1988).
241. Id. § 25356 (West Supp. 1988). It should be noted that there will probably be insufficient
funds at any one time to remediate all of the listed sites.
242. See id § 25356.1 (West Supp. 1988). This section provides for judicial review of any
final remedial plan issued by the Department or a regional board. However, California Health
and Safety Code section 25356.1(h) also provides for a petition to be filed with the State Board
to review any regional board action regarding a remedial action plan. While not specifically
stated, it appears that any person who decides to contest a regional board action remedial
action plan must first exhaust their administrative remedies by filing a petition with the State
Board. See Hampson v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 472, 136 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1977). Also,
responsible parties may seek arbitration regarding apportioned liability in the remedial action
pursuant to California Health and Safety Code section 25356.2. CAL. HEALTH & SAnn- CODE
§ 25356.2 (vest Supp. 1988).

1015

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 19

containing hazardous substances. 24s Tanks installed prior to January
1, 1984, require extensive monitoring in order to detect any tank
leakage. 2 " Tanks installed after January 1, 1984, must have two walls
in order to contain any leakage if the inside wall does not hold the
hazardous substance3" The law is implemented by all counties in the
state and some approved cities pursuant to regulations adopted by
the State Board. 2"
Permits are good for five years. 247 Inspections are required once
every three years,m and an annual report to the permitting agency
on tank usage, changes in tank content, or monitoring must be
made. 2 9 Any pipe installed after July 1, 1987, which is connected to
an underground tank must be equipped with secondary containment.2 0
Double walled tanks must be designed and constructed with a monitoring system capable of detecting the entry of the stored hazardous
substance into the secondary containment.25 ' Unauthorized releases of
2
contained substances must be reported to the local permitting agencyY
The underground tank law does not directly address responsibility for
the cleanup of unauthorized releases. However, the law does state
that a local agency may request the State Board, a regional board,
or the state Department of Health Services to take action pursuant
to their organic laws. 23 In actual practice, cleanup of hazardous
material from leaking underground tanks takes a variety of forms.

Cleanup and abatement orders have been issued by regional boards,
which have also assessed civil liability against responsible parties.
Cleanup has been ordered by some local agencies, and some leaking
tanks have been placed on the State Super Fund list for remedial
action.
In an effort to gain greater local participation in the cleanup of
leaking underground tanks, the state's 1987-88 Budget Act authorized
$7.5 million for the cost of local agencies to oversee cleanup by
responsible parties.
243.

CAL. HEaxa

& SATrY CODE §§ 25280-25299.6 (underground storage of hazardous

substances).
244.
245.

Id. § 25292 (West Supp. 1988).
Id. § 25291 (West Supp. 1988).

246.

Id. § 25283 (West Supp. 1988).

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

1016

§
§
§
§
§
§
§

25285 (West Supp. 1988).
25288 (West Supp. 1988).
25286(c) (West Supp. 1988).
25291(a)(7)(E) (West Supp. 1988).
25291(b) (West Supp. 1988).
25295 ('West Supp. 1988).
25297 (West Supp. 1988).
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C.

UndergroundInjection of Toxic Waste

The Toxic Injection Well Control Act of 1985 is aimed at less than
ten existing injection wells in California. Given the small number of
existing wells and the general prohibitory nature of the Act, it is
unlikely that new injection wells will be constructed.5 4 The Injection
Control Act provides that anyone using an injection well after January
1, 1960, for the discharge of hazardous Waste must provide detailed
information to the Department of Health SerVices.2- The use of
injection wells after January 1, 1986, is prohibited unless an exemption
is obtained from the Department.2 6
The Department of Health Services has the authority to prohibit
the use of injection wells2 7 and inspect injection wells.2 Anyone
applying for a permit to use an injection well must file with the
Department a lengthy hydrologic assessment report.29
While the Underground Tank Law and the Underground Injection
Control Act are fairly straightforward, the next two laws to be
discussed are complex in their wording and in their application. In
fact, the complexity is so great that it is only possible to give the
reader a survey of the scope of the laws. Practical application is still
a matter of growing interpretation.
D.

Toxic Pits Act

The Toxic Pits Cleanup Act of 1984 grew out of research reports
indicating that hazardous waste from surface impoundmentsm was
migrating to usable groundwater. The Act prohibits a discharge of

254. See id. §§ 25159.10-25159.25 (West Supp. 1988).

255. Id. § 25159.13 (West Supp. 1988).
256. Id. § 25159.15 (Vest Supp.
257. Id. § 25159.16 (West Supp.
258. Id. § 25159.17 (vest Supp.
259. Id. § 25159.18 (West Supp.
260. Surface impoundments are
25208.2(w) as follows:

1988).
1988).
1988).
1988).
defined in California Health and Safety Code section

Surface impoundment or impoundment means a waste management unit or part of
a waste management unit which is a natural topographic depression, artificial excavation, or diked area formed primarily of earthen materials, although it may be lined
with artificial materials, which is designed to hold an accumulation of liquid hazardous

wastes or hazardous wastes containing free liquids, including but not limited to
holding, storage, settling, or aeration pits, evaporation ponds, percolation ponds,
other ponds, and lagoons. Surface impoundment does not include a landfill, a land

farm, a pile, emergency containment dike, tank, or an injection well.
Id. § 25208.2(w) (West Supp. 1988).
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liquid hazardous wastes or hazardous wastes containing free liquids
into a surface impoundment after June 30, 1988. This prohibition is
effective if the surface impoundment or the land immediately beneath
it contains hazardous wastes and is within one-half mile upgradient
from a potential source of drinking water. The Act also prohibits the
discharge of liquid hazardous wastes or hazardous waste containing
free liquids into any surface impoundment after January 1, 1988,
unless the impoundment is double lined, contains a leachate collection
system, and monitoring is conducted. Additionally, the Act requires
the discharger to file a hydrologic assessment report, the factual
cornerstone of the Act. While the Act allows for exemptions, few
people have applied for them, apparently based on the theory that
the exemption process is too expensive and the likelihood of success
is remote at best.261 If hazardous wastes are polluting state waters,
the Act directs the regional boards to use their existing Porter-Cologne
Act enforcement powers. 262

Both mining waste and pesticide waste (e.g., rinse water from
pesticide containers, crop duster airplane washing, etc.) are given
special consideration in the Act. 263 Special provisions also apply to
persons who have closed a toxic pit or will close a toxic pit by
January 1, 1988.6
When the discharger to the impoundment fails to meet the "cease
discharge" time-line in the Act, the regional board's options include
issuance of cease and desist orders, cleanup and abatement orders,
administrative civil liability orders, and referral to the attorney general
for judicial injunctive relief or civil monetary remedies. Failure of
the discharger to file a hydrologic assessment report could result in
civil liability. The Act provides for liability between $1,000 and
$10,000 per day for each day the report has not been received by a
regional board, with recovery through the courts. An injunction
requiring submittal of a hydrologic assessment report may also be
sought.
In addition to the above, the regional boards may also seek administrative civil liability if a hydrologic assessment report is not filed
in a timely manner. Health and Safety Code section 25208.11 specif-

261.

See id. § 25208.4(b) (vest Supp. 1988) (exemption process). See also id. § 25208.8

(vest Supp. 1988) (description of the contents of the lengthy and expensive hydrological
assessment report).
262.
263.
264.
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Id. §§ 25208.13, 25208.15 (Vest Supp. 1988).
Id. § 25208.17 (Vest Supp. 1988).
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ically provides that the Porter-Cologne Act provisions are not limited
by the Toxic Pits Act. California Water Code section 13267 authorizes
regional boards to require dischargers to prepare technical and monitoring reports. Where hydrologic assessment reports have been requested under this section, administrative civil liability may be assessed
against any person failing or refusing to furnish the requested information. When a person knowingly fails or refuses to submit the
requested information, then the person is also guilty of a misdemeanor. 265
Anyone working with the Toxic Pits Act must also consider the
State Board's regulations on waste disposal to land, commonly known
as the "subchapter 15 regulations. '' 6 Whereas the Toxic Pits Act
covers only surface impoundments that receive liquid hazardous waste
or hazardous waste containing free liquids, subchapter 15 regulations
deal in an extensive and detailed manner with all aspects of waste
disposal to land. Subchapter 15 covers both hazardous and nonhazardous wastes in landfills and surface impoundments, land treatment facilities, and waste piles. The subchapter 15 regulations relating
to surface impoundments that receive hazardous waste are consistent
with the Toxic Pits Act. However, subchapter 15 imposes additional
requirements that must be met, such as specified monitoring and
construction requirements. Where the Toxic Pits Act requires liners,
leachate control, and monitoring, subchapter 15 details the performance and design standards for such control measures.
An example of the far-reaching results of the Toxic Pits Act
occurred in 1987 when the Central Valley Regional Water Quality
Control Board applied the Act to the discharge of agricultural drainage
water to evaporation ponds when the water contained selenium in
amounts rendering the drainage water hazardous. The discharger first
argued that the Toxic Pits Act did not apply to agricultural activities.
The response from the Board was severalfold. First, the Board stated
that nowhere in the Act is there any exemption or special treatment
of agricultural waste as there is for mining and pesticide waste, In
fact, the Act applies to "every person discharging liquid hazardous
wastes ... into a surface impoundment." It is black letter law that

if a statute contains express exceptions it is presumed that no other
267
exceptions were intended.

265.
266.

CAL. WATER CODE § 13268(c) (West Supp. 1988).
CAL. ADrmI. CODE tit. 23, §§ 2510-2601 (1987).

267. It is also black letter law that if the language of a statute is clear, effect must be given
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The discharger next argued that the Board had to comply with
certain policy and planning provisions of the Porter-Cologne Act
before implementing the Toxic Pits Act. As indicated at the beginning
of this discussion, the Toxic Pits Act is part of the hazardous waste
control laws codified in the Health and Safety Code and is generally
separate from the Porter-Cologne Act. The Toxic Pits Act is quite
detailed and mandates that its provisions apply. It is not implemented
by the Porter-Cologne Act provisions except for some available enforcement measures.
E. Proposition 65
So far, we have seen that a general water quality control law with
very general and expansive provisions (Porter-Cologne Act) is complicated in its implementation by the enactment of statutes which deal
with site-specific discharges to toxic pits, underground injection, and
from leaking tanks. In November 1986, the voters approved an
initiative measure which further complicates the world of water quality
regulation. The initiative is called the "Safe Drinking Water and
Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986" and is commonly known by its
ballot number-Proposition 65 or Prop. 65 for short. As an initiative
measure, it could not be vetoed by the Governor and can only be
amended by the legislature pursuant to the provisions contained within
the proposition. Uncodified section 7 of the Proposition provides that
it can be amended by a two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature
to further the purposes of the Proposition. The effective date of the
Proposition was January 1, 1987, but certain features of the Proposition do not come into effect until much later. Unfortunately, Prop.
65 does not appear in one location in the printed codes, but instead
adds to or amends existing provisions in the Health and Safety Code. 268
With respect to water, Prop. 65 contains a prohibition on the discharge
of cancer causing chemicals to sources of drinking water. The prohibition provides that "no person in the course of doing business

to the statute's plain meaning. See County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. App.
3d 481, 485, 181 Cal. Rptr. 775, 777 (1982). While it has been alleged that one or more

legislators have stated that it was not their intent that the act apply to agriculture, it is clear
that no effect can be given to an individual legislator's statement of intent. See California
Teachers Ass'n. v. San Diego Community College Dist., 28 Cal. 3d, 692, 699-700, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 817 (1981).
268. Proposition 65 is partially codified at California Health and Safety Code sections

2549.5-2549.13. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFry

CODE

§§ 25189.5, 25192 (West Supp. 1988)

(amended by Propositon 65). Also several sections of Proposition 65 are uncodified.
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shall knowingly discharge or release a chemical known to the state to
cause cancer or reproductive toxicity into water or onto or into land
where such chemical passes or probably will pass into any source of

drinking water, notwithstanding any other provision or authorization
of law except as provided in section 25249.9." 269 A source of drinking
water means either a present source of drinking water or water which

is identified or designated in a water quality control plan adopted by
a regional board as being suitable for domestic or municipal use.270

A "person in the course of doing business" is defined in Prop. 65
as a business employing ten or more employees.2 71 This means by its
very terms the Proposition does not apply to large volumes of waste

water discharged from public entities, such as local sanitation districts.
Nor does Prop. 65 apply to discharges by the state, county, or city

governments, even if such a discharge is to a source of drinking
water.
Another problem with Prop. 65 is the lack of definition of the
various unique words and phrases contained in the law. In order to
remedy this deficiency, the state Health and Welfare Agency (designated as the lead agency to implement Prop. 65 by the Governor) is
publishing guidelines and eventually regulations containing definitions
2
of some of the undefined words and phrases .
The prohibition on the discharge of cancer causing chemicals and
reproductive toxins does not go into effect until twenty months

subsequent to the listing of the chemical by the Health and Welfare
Agency. 273 Since no attempt was made by the drafters of Prop. 65 to

269. Id. § 25249.5 (West Supp. 1988).
270. Id. § 25249.11(d) (vest Supp. 1988). This is the only section of Prop. 65 which
contains a cross-reference to the Porter-Cologne Act. Unfortunately, the water quality control
plans are, in some cases vague about what is and what is not a source of drinking water. In
an effort to provide a baseline on what is drinking water, the State Board has adopted a state
policy entitled, "Sources of Drinking Water." State Water Resources Control Board Resolution
No. 88-63 (May 19, 1988). The Resolution defines drinking water for both surface and
groundwater. All state agencies are mandated to comply with such policy unless otherwise
specifically directed to the contrary.
271. Id. § 25249.11(b) (West Supp. 1988).
272. Such definitions will eventually appear in chapter 1, division 24, title 26 of the California
Administrative Code.
273. The creation of the chemical list has been a somewhat long and involved process. First,
many persons assumed that an initial list of approximately 200 chemicals would be published
within three months of the effective date of the Proposition, because of the language in
California Health and Safety Code section 25249.8 which purports to incorporate several cancer
lists by reference. However because of other language in the Proposition which states in essence
that the list of chemicals would be created by experts in the field, the Health and Welfare
Agency published an initial list of 32 chemicals on February 27, 1987, and has substantially
added to the list as of this writing. In fact, it is obvious that the list will continue to grow for
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integrate it with the Porter-Cologne Act, all dischargers to ground or
surface water which could possibly be a source of drinking water
have been notified that their waste discharge requirements, NPDES
permits, or enforcement orders, do not insulate and protect them
from the prohibitions contained in Prop. 65.
The absolute prohibition on the discharge of the listed chemicals
does have several exemptions. The first exemption states that the
prohibition is not effective until the chemical discharged has been on
the list of cancer causing chemicals for twenty months. The second
exemption is a statutory narrative exemption from the discharge
prohibition and has two parts. Part 1 provides the prohibition on
discharge does not apply if the "discharge or release will not cause
any significant amount of discharged or released chemical to enter
any source of drinking water." 274 Part 2 provides that the discharge
or release must be in conformity with all other laws and regulations.2 75
The term "significant amount" is defined to mean "any detectable
amount," except an amount which meets yet an additional exemption
test. The "any detectable amount" exemption may be difficult to
meet given the current ability to detect very low levels of chemicals
in water.
If the discharger cannot meet part 1 of the above test, there is one
additional exemption test for dischargers. Dischargers can discharge
the chemical in question if they can demonstrate that:
the exposure poses no significant risk assuming lifetime exposure at

the level in question for substances known to the state to cause
cancer (i.e. chemicals on the list) and that the exposure will have
no observable effect assuming exposure at one thousand (1,000)
times the level in question for substances known to the state to
276
cause reproductive toxicity ....
An obvious flaw in the law is that Proposition 65 does not specify
who grants this exemption. There are three current non-judicial possible alternatives for getting an exemption. First, in response to a
request regarding a site specific discharge, the State Health and
the indefinite future as other chemicals are investigated in addition to the ones on the initial
target list. The listing of the chemicals is based upon the recommendation of a 12 person
scientific advisory panel appointed by the Governor. It is also interesting to note that of the
approximately 200 chemicals on the target list, most will probably not be found in discharges.
Many are drugs used in research, experimental chemicals, chemicals no longer used in California,
etc. In fact it appears that probably not more than 50 chemicals will be of significance in terms
of discharges to water. The big unknown however is what the list of reproductive toxins will
look like. As of this writing there appears to be no agreed upon list of such chemicals.
274. CAL. HEamA & SArv= CODE § 25249.9(b)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
275. Id. § 25249.9(b)(2) (,Vest Supp. 1988).
276. Id. § 25249.10(c) (West Supp. 1988).

1022

1988 / Overview
Welfare Agency will give an advisory opinion on a safe level of a
chemical in drinking water. 277 Second, the Agency will provide "no
significant risk" numbers for some chemicals the Agency thinks are
the most critical. 2 8 Third, the Agency has set forth an approved
process by which a person could determine a safe use level on his
own. However, under this process it would seem there could be
multiple safe use numbers for the same chemical.2 79 A fourth option
is that as a result of a lawsuit, a court could determine a safe level
of use for an individual chemical in general or safe use for a chemical
discharged at a specific site.
Prop. 65 is enforced by the State Attorney General, county district
attorneys, and some city attorneys. Enforcement can also be initiated
under certain circumstances by private persons. Enforcement actions
include injunctions and civil penalties not to exceed $2,500 per day.
A final interesting facet of Prop. 65 regarding water quality relates
to the reporting of information related to the illegal discharge of
hazardous waste. A person must make a report if the person knows
the discharge will cause substantial injury to the public health and
safety. This reporting requirement relates to hazardous waste and not
the listed chemicals. There are probably thousands of hazardous
chemicals. The persons who have to make such reports are so-called
"designated employees" under a different law. There are approximately 20,000 such public employees at the state, county, city, and
special district level. Under this reporting requirement, the public
employee has difficult decisions to make. First, designated employees
must report the information they receive within seventy-two hours to
local officials. Failure to report could result in a felony conviction
and loss of public employment. On the other hand, not every unauthorized discharge of hazardous waste will require the employee to
report since not all discharges will put the employee on notice of a
substantial threat of injury to public health and safety.
F.

Agricultural Regulation Generally

The great agricultural machine which fuels California's economy
and provides the state, the nation, and the world with over 200

277. See Guideline and Safe Use Determination Procedures,
87, No. 11-12, A-25 (app. B) (March 13, 1987).

CAIFoRNIA

NonTcE

REGISTER

278. Under this procedure no request for determination and fee need be filed with the
Agency.
279. See H-ALT AND WELFARE AGENCY INTERPRETATrvE GUmELNs 87-5, DERmNATION
oF No SIGNIFIcANT RISK LEVElS FOR CARCINOGENS; 87-6 No OBSERVABLE EFFECT LEvis FOR
REPRODUCTIVE To~acA-Ts.
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different crops brings with it certain practices which are now known
to have serious deleterious effects on water quality. Agricultural
operations have always received "special consideration" when water
quality laws were prepared or enforced. For example, the term "point
source of pollution" as used in the federal Clean Water Act does not
include agricultural storm water discharges and return flows from
irrigated agriculture.n o This has in effect written irrigated agriculture
out of any regulation under the Clean Water Act. When the PorterCologne Act was enacted, statements were inserted into the legislative
history by state lawmakers indicating that historically irrigated agri-

culture had not been regulated under previous water quality control
laws.2n For example, state officials have been aware of the potential
salt balance problems since the inception of the massive state and
federal water projects in the state. In 1974, the California Department
of Water Resources stated in Bulletin 127-74:
The salt management problem in the San Joaquin Valley is not a
unique one; the problem has plagued irrigated agriculture in all arid
and semi-arid areas of the world since before the beginning of
recorded history. Many flourishing early civilizations fell principally
because of an inability to understand and cope with salt balance
and drainage problems. The Tigris and Euphrates River Valleys in
ancient Mesopotamia became mostly desert because of the accumulation of salts in the surface soil layers. Relics of abandoned irrigation
systems, alkali areas, and salt accumulation extending from the
Sahara Desert through ancient Persia show that a lack of proper
drainage eventually resulted in the physical and economic ruin of
vast agriculturally productive areas.
Today one need only fly over the great Central Valley at 30,000 feet
to view the vast patches of white encrusted ground which verify this
phenomenon. However, today there appears to be a new awareness

280. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(14) (West 1986).
281. While legislative intent statements such as these did not legally prevent the regional
boards from regulating irrigated agriculture, they did have a chilling effect upon such regulation.
Irrigation districts which put in "tile drains" to carry away water from the root zone and thus
had point source discharges which could be easily regulated, complained that regulation of
agricultural return flow should be uniform, and not based upon the type of drainage system
constructed. Also, after attempts were made by the Central Valley Regional Board to propose
modest regulatory measures for irrigated agriculture in the mid 1970s, a series of legislative
hearings resulted in oversight of regional board practices. While the results of such hearings
did not outright prevent regional board regulation, the Porter-Cologne Act was amended to
provide that prior to implementation of any agricultural water quality control program, an
estimate of the total cost of such program, together with an identification of potential sources
of financing, shall be indicated in any regional water quality control plan. See CAL. VAaR
CODE § 13141 (West Supp. 1988).
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of water quality problems resulting from irrigated agriculture. The
State and regional boards have taken action to regulate such problems
as herbicides in the Sacramento River, agricultural ponds under the
282
Toxic Pits Act, and the problems of selenium at Kesterson Reservoir.
III.

STATUTORY INTERFACE OF WATER QuALrrY

AND WATER RIGHTS

In creating the State Board and the subsequent enactment of the
Porter-Cologne Act, the legislature added certain provisions to the
basic water rights law which required the State Board, in its water
rights process, to consider water quality issues.83 For example, the
Board can approve an appropriation of water to protect or enhance
water quality.28 Additionally, the Board can ensure that natural flow
remains in a water course to protect beneficial uses designated in a
regional board's water quality control plan.8 5 The State Board has
dealt with the water rights/water quality interface on many occasions.
Many of these occasions arise when the Board is exercising its statutory
water rights functions through the determination of waste and unreasonable use and its authority to review regional board actions. Instances of the water rights/water quality interfacing have been
associated with the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) and the Salton
Sea, Kesterson Wildlife Refuge, Mono Lake, and the Sacramento-San
Joaquin Delta.
A.

Kesterson

In 1984, the spotlight of regulatory attention focused on irrigated
agriculture in a meaningful way. The State Water Board concluded
that the United States Bureau of Reclamation, in its operation of the
Kesterson Drainage Reservoir, discharged wastewater which reached
or threatened to reach surface water. This discharge caused or threatened to cause pollution and nuisance. The reservoir, located in Merced
County, had originally been designed in 1968 by the federal government as a series of ponds to regulate the flow of irrigation runoff
from San Joaquin farmland into San Francisco Bay. The Board

282. See supra notes 260-267 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., CAL. VATER CODE §§ 1242.5 (release of appropriated water), 1243 (recreation;
preservation of fish and wildlife), 1243.5 (preservation of source water), 1257(consideration of
relative benefit), 1257.5 (consideratioan of stream flow requirements), 1258 (consideration of
water quality control plants).
284. Id. § 1242.5 (West Supp. 1988).
285. Id. §§ 1243.5, 1258 (West Supp. 1988).
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concluded that since the Kesterson Reservoir was located within one-

half mile upgradient from a drinking water source, the runoff water
was hazardous waste for purposes of the State Board's subchapter 15

regulations and the Toxic Pits Act. The Board's action resulted in
the historic February 5, 1985 order directing the United States
Department of Interior to clean up its problem at Kesterson within a
designated time. The irony of the Kesterson salt balance/pesticide

contamination issues is that they all resulted from the operation of
massive water projects which, under state law, are dependent upon
state water rights permits and licenses. It is obvious that, with the
exception of the salt balance problem, the state was oblivious to the
potential for other water quality problems when the water permits
6

were issued.1

B. Imperial Irrigation District
In 1984 the State Board concluded that the Imperial Irrigation
District (IID) allowed approximately one million acre-feet per year of
its 2.6 million acre-feet annual allotment of Colorado River water to
enter the Salton Sea as irrigation return flow. s7 The Board's decision
stated that allowing such a large volume of water to drain to the sea

constituted a misuse of water under the California Constitution and
California Water Code.28 The Board ordered the IID to implement

specific water conservation measures already called for by IID
policies and to develop a detailed water conservation plan. Among
the many issues raised during the Board's six day hearing was the

286. Both the Kesterson and IID issues were brought to the state's attention by individuals.
In the IID case, a farmer within the lID filed a waste and unreasonable use petition with the
state because the massive return flows made the Salton Sea rise and flood his farm land. In
the Kesterson case, a person who owned land adjoining Kesterson appealed to the Central
Valley Regional Board for relief after alleging that his land was being destroyed by the Kesterson
operation. At the same time the United States Fish and Wildlife Service was documenting the
birth defects of wildlife in the Kesterson area. When the regional board failed to grant any
relief, the landowner filed a petition with the State Board requesting the Board to review the
inaction of the regional board. After a series of hearings the State Board issued order No. WQ
85-1 requiring the United States to cleanup and abate the effects of the drainage water at
Kesterson. The proximate cause of the birth defects to wildlife, of course, was selenium
poisoning. The selenium was located in the soil and leached out when irrigation water passed
through it. The Westlands Water District had placed collecting drains below the root zone to
take away the highly saline leachate and the collected water was taken by open drainage ditch
to the Kesterson Reservoir and there further concentrated to the ultimate harm of the wildlife.
The baseline lessons of IID and Kesterson are twofold: First, one person can have a great
impact on the water history of this state and second, we must always expect the unexpectedl
287. State Water Resources Control Board Decision 1600.
288. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; CAL, WATER CODE § 100 (West 1971).
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impact that water conservation within the district would have on the
salinity of the Salton Sea. The modern day Salton Sea was formed
in 1905 when the Colorado River broke through its banks and flooded
a low lying, closed basin straddling the Imperial-Riverside counties
border. After two years of flooding the basin, the river bank was
repaired and the Colorado River ceased to flow to the Salton Sea.
The Sea in its present state is dependent on the drainage of irrigation
return flow from the surrounding irrigation districts such as IID. 289
Saltier than the ocean, the Sea's salinity level is approximately 39,000
ppm. Yet even at this high salinity level the sea supports an extensive
fishery. 210 However, at salinity levels above 40,000 ppm, reproduction
is expected to fail. At 50,000 ppm, adult fish would be adversely
affected. Reduction of inflow due to conservation by the IID will
undoubtedly result in an increased salinity in the Sea. However, the
salinity of the Sea has increased measurably in recent years, even
without reduction of IID inflow. Based upon these facts the Board
found that a prolonged delay in water conservation measures by IID
291
would not save the fishery for an appreciable length of time.
C. Mono Lake
In 1940, the city of Los Angeles' Department of Water and Power
was granted a permit to appropriate water by the State of California
to divert water from streams tributary to Mono Lake. In 1974, the
city received a license from the State Water Resources Control Board
to appropriate an amount of water in accordance with the terms of
the permit. The permit and license issued by the state had the net
effect of reducing the inflow to Mono Lake. The reduction of inflow
resulted in reduction of the lake levels and increased salinity of the
lake.
As a result of a lawsuit filed by the Audubon Society, the CaliforniaSupreme Court merged the public trust doctrine with the California
water right system. 292 The court held that the State Board has a
continuing duty to supervise the taking and use of appropriated water

289. During the period 1972-82, 78% of the total inflow to the Salton Sea came from IID.
290. The fishery is mainly a sport fish called corvina.
291. In November 1986, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division 1, upheld
the authority of the board to adjudicate the issue of unreasonable use of water by IID. See
Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1162, 231
Cal. Rptr. 283 (1986).
292. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal.

Rptr. 346 (1983).
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under the public trust doctrine. This duty included the water from
Mono Lake tributaries. As part of this duty, the Board has the

authority to reexamine diversions of water appropriated under the
Water Code to determine whether the diversions should be changed
to protect the public trust uses of water. The court also stated that
the courts have an equal ability to determine the public trust interests.
In addition the supreme court stated that both the existing uses and
the uses following any reallocation of water through the reexamination
must conform to the standard of reasonableness contained in article
X, section 2 of the California Constitution. As of this writing, neither
the State Board nor a trial court has reexamined the water right
licenses for diversions from the tributaries of Mono Lake. After the
supreme court decision, there followed a flurry of court cases to
apply the enunciated law to specific facts. 29
D.

Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta

The two largest water projects in the state are the federal Central
Valley Project and the State Water Project. The two projects deliver

water to the vast farming areas of the Central Valley and to Southern
California. Both projects divert the majority of their water from the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. In order for the water to be fit for
domestic, industrial, and agricultural use, the quality of the Delta's

water must be controlled. The primary quality problem is salt con-

293. After the Supreme Court decision in Audubon, the case was returned to the federal
district court for a decision as to whether the federal court would exercise jurisdiction and, if
it does, how it will proceed. In Dahigren v. City of Los Angeles, (the so-called Rush Creek
case) the plaintiff seeks to require the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power to release
water from its dam on Rush Creek in Mono county to maintain fishlife downstream. In Mono
Lake Committee v. City of Los Angeles (the so-called Lee Vining Creek case), the plaintiffs
seek to require Los Angeles Department of Water and Power to release water from its dam on
Lee Vining Creek in Mono county to maintain fishlife downstream. These lawsuits raise issues
related to the public trust doctrine, CEQA violations, and violation of Fish and Game Code
section 5937. In California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Board and National
Audubon Society v. State Water Resources Control Board, the plaintiffs seek to require the
state board to revise Los Angeles' water right license to include a term or condition that requires
full compliance with Fish and Game Code section 5937. The current posture of the aforementioned cases is as follows: Cal Trout and National Audubon have been argued before the
California Court of Appeal for the Third District. Issues include the statute of limitations to
file the action, whether the Board's continuing authority requires it to initiate a reexamination
of the Department of Water and Power's license and the meaning of Fish and Game Code
section 5496. Lee Vining was heard for a preliminary injunction in October 1987 and the court
ordered Los Angeles to maintain a small flow. A study will also be done regarding fish needs,
Dahlgren is awaiting completion of a study before going to trial for a "public trust balancing."
Trial is anticipated in 1989; meanwhile the court has ordered that a small flow is to be
maintained by the city.
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tamination. Salt is contained in the water the tides bring up from
San Francisco Bay. In order for the state and federal water projects
to function properly, the salt water from the bay must be repelled
from the water which is pumped south. With respect to exports of
water from the Delta, the measure of the water right is as much the
quality of the water as the quantity.
In order to ensure that the competing uses of the Delta's waters

are properly balanced, the State Board has held, since 1967, a series
of hearings and issued a series of orders. These orders have generally
placed limits on the quantity of water that could be exported by the
two major projects and have also placed limits on the export of water
depending on its quality. Currently, the State Board is embarked on
a three year hearing process on the Delta. The matters being addressed
by the Board are twofold. First, the Board is undertaking a planning
process to address the flow and salinity of water in the Bay-Delta
estuary. Second, because it is apparent that flow and salinity in the
Delta are greatly influenced by the diversion and use of water by
holders of water rights, the Board will reexamine and possibly modify
existing water rights to achieve planned-for salinity and flow levels in
the Delta.
The relationship between water quality law and water rights law in
the current hearing can most simply be described as one of seriatim
planning and implementation. The relationship between the two bodies
of law was recently extensively reviewed by the California Court of
Appeal for the First District, in United States v. State Water Resources
Control Board.294 In this case, the court defined the relationship and
gave instructions on the procedural requirements to address flow and
salinity problems. In that decision, the court emphasized that the
water rights of the parties should not be considered in setting the
water quality standards for the Delta. Rather, the standards should
be set to provide reasonable protection for the beneficial uses of the
waters of the Delta. In determining what is reasonable protection for
the beneficial uses, the Board is instructed to consider all demands
being made and to be made of the waters of the estuary, as well as
the amount of water available. After a water quality control plan is
adopted, it may be implemented in a variety of ways, both within
and outside of the authority of the Board. Implementation measures
are to be set forth and described in the program of implementation
in the plan.
294.

Cal. App. 3d 82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986).
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The court further held that the Board in a water right proceeding
may enforce relevant parts of the water quality control plan by
requiring the water right holders within the watershed of the Delta
to change their diversions and use of water. If the Board required
changes in diversions of water, it could do so by invoking its (1)
reserved jurisdiction over certain permits under Water Code section
1394, (2) continuing authority to prevent waste and unreasonable use
or unreasonable method of use or diversion of water under California
Constitution, article X, section 2, or (3) continuing authority to protect
public trust uses of water. 295 In accordance with National Audubon
and United States, any change in water rights the Board required
would be consistent with the public interest and would be reasonable
under California Constitution, article X, section 2. According to
United States, determinations of reasonableness would require a balancing of competing public interests, public trust uses, water quality
interests, water supply interests, and other matters. What constitutes
a reasonable use or method of diversion is ordinarily a question of
fact. It is for this very reason that the factual determinations of the
Board are pivotal to any proper balancing.

295.

(1983).
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